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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
I "his ( JOUI t has ji iris diction pursi lant to I Ital i Code \ i m. § 78-2a-3(2) 
STATEMENT OF T H E ISSUES 
Did the trial court apply the correct legal standard in determining whether the 
Bradleys breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for determining whether the trial court 
applied the correct legal standard for a breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
claims is the correction of error standard. I n, S tak • v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,, the 1 Itah Supreme 
Court determined that a standard of review question is not always black and white (or 
correctness vs. clearly erroneous). There is a continuum between the clearly erroneous and 
cc i rectness of error standards Q\ lestions of fact (invoi\ ing events actions :>i conditions 
happening, existing, or taking place) are reviewed for clear error and questions of law (rules 
or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status H. .iindar 
circi instances) are reviewed for correctness. l l ie issue of whetb • •: •• 1"• • - fi i; . *h:-.\ 1 he 
correct legal standard in its good faith analysis is closer to a question of fact because the 
scope of the duty to act in good faith is defined by common-law principles, and the terms of 
in unambiguous < ontnui bail) quesnous <»l tiw Sub|rcti\r laciiul issue- >^ h -^ ]\ir-u's 
intent and expectations could be involved in the question, but are not presented in the case 
at bar because the parties did not make any statements of intent regarding the amount of 
discretion a ivcllci" ikb when reviewing ;i btn/m crrdil puiMi.iut 1*» thv SFA, 
Issue Preserved at: K 399; TT 405:12 through 408:14. 
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2. Did the trial court err in failing to grant the Bradleys' motion for directed verdict 
at the close of Plaintiffs case? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a denial of a directed verdict is the same 
for the reviewing court as it is for the trial court. Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 975 P.2d 467, 468 
(Utah 1999) (motion for directed verdict can be granted only when the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law). 
Issue Preserved at: & 250:13 through 255:6 
3. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the Bradleys waived their right to 
strictly enforce the Septmeber 13 financial disclosure deadline? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard in an 
analysis of "waiver" is a pure question of law. However, the actions or events allegedly 
supporting waiver are factual in nature, thus a reviewing court must grant "broadened 
discretion to the trial court's [factual] findings." United Vark City Mines Co. v. Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, % 21,140 P.3d 1200. 
Issue Preserved at: & 392-398; TV 405:1-4. 
4. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the Bradleys were estopped from 
strictly enforcing the September 13 deadline? 
Standard of Revtiew: Estoppel is a highly fact-specific question that an appellate court 
reviews under an abuse of discretion standard. State, Dept. of Human Services ex rel. Parker v. 
IriZarry, 893 P.2d 1107,1108-09. (Utah 1995). 
Issue Preserved at: R 392-398; I T 405:1-4. 
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5. Did the trial court err in ordering specific performance? • -
Standard of Review: Specific performance is a discretionary ruling that a reviewing court 
exam i nes i i nder an abi i se ot di scretion standard., Shields v. 1 1 irris , 934 F 2d 653, 655 (I Itah ( x. 
App. 1997). 
Issue Preserved at: k ^v; 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
I Nature of the Case. This case involves the enforcement of "specific performance" 
i n r elation to a Real Estate 1 *ui chase ( bntract between! )etenda nts> Appel lants Joii :i i J", 
Bradley ("Mr. Bradley") and Darby G. Bradley ("Mrs. Bradley") and Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
Douglas J. Markham ("Mr. Markham") and Andrea Markham aka Andrea Gasporra ("Mrs. 
Markh; im"). 
The Bradleys were owners of on which the Bradleys had built a 3,000-square-foot log house-
style home (the "Property"). The Bradleys listed their real property located in Dammeron 
was the listing agent. Ms. Carolyn Norton ("Ms. Norton"), agent for the Markhams 
ultimately prepared a REPC after the Bradleys agreed to sell the Property at the price of Five 
I Ii indred and Fifty Thoi :i sa ndDol lars ($550,000.00) ]\ if. Brad ley insisted that any sa k 
would be partially seller-financed to allow the Bradleys to utilize certain tax advantages. 
Along with the REPC, Mr. Bradley also received the Seller Financing Addendum ("SFA") to 
flie RFPC ', HOWI'TH", l"\i. Notion did not pnoeiif fir Buyer Financial Information Shed (as 
required by Section 8 of the SFA to the REPC) at that time. 
On September 2,2004, the Bradleys made a written counteroffer. Ihe principal 
terms oi I: he J \ B PC /u Iti mately inch ided a pi :i r chase price ot $550,000 00 wit Ii a do^\ n 
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payment of $285,000.00, earnest money to be increased to $10,000.00. Pursuant to the SFA, 
the Bradleys were to finance $265,000.00 at a rate of 5.5% per annum. Ms. Norton set up a 
time for the Markhams and other individuals to visit the Property on September 12,2004 to 
discuss various outstanding matters and to present certain financial information that was to 
be delivered by September 13. Specifically, Section 8 of the SFA required the Markhams to 
present a credit report by the Seller Disclosure Deadline referred to in Section 24(b) of the 
REPC (September 13, 2004). 
During the September 12, 2004 meeting, Mr. Bradley appeared agitated and tired. 
Although he allowed the parties to enter the home, Mr. Bradley indicated that he did not 
wish to discuss any of the financial issues or review the documents presented by the 
Markhams. Ms. Norton responded that the Markhams had certain financial information 
(presumably the information required by Section 7 of the SFA) to present. Mr. Bradley, 
responded that it was not a good time to discuss matters and did not review the documents. 
Although Mr. Bradley inquired whether the discussion could be had in a "couple of weeks/' 
Ms. Norton never affirmed this, nor did she prepare any writing to extend the relevant 
deadlines in the REPC and SFA-
Ms. Norton admitted at trial that her clients did not have a credit report to present on 
September 12, 2004. After leaving the Property, Ms. Norton called her assistant, who 
mistakenly told Ms. Norton that the Markhams had until September 30, 2004 to submit the 
financial information. 
On September 13, 2004, Mr. Bradley prepared and submitted to Ms. Norton by fax 
the Seller's Property Disclosure information. After returning from Washington, Mrs. Bradley 
drafted a letter dated September 20,2004 to Ms. Norton and informed her of their intent to 
4 
declare the REPC null and void due to the Markham's failure to timely provide their Credit 
Report, Buyer Financial Information Sheet, and supporting documentation. After several 
telephone calls and letters, the Bradleys finally received the Credit Report and financial 
information on September 27, 2004. 
On or about September 30, 2004, Mr. Bradley received a fax from Ms. Norton's 
office forwarding a letter from Countrywide Home Loans indicating that the Markhams had 
qualified for third-party financing to complete the purchase of the home. 
Despite the threats of litigation, the Bradleys agreed to receive and review the 
Markham's financial documents and Credit Report and discovered several items of concern 
related to the Markham's credit-worthiness. The financial documents revealed that there had 
been a bankruptcy and judgment in the Markhams' past. Furthermore, in reviewing the 
credit report, the Bradleys discovered several delinquencies on the accounts and the amount 
of credit currently being held, which gave rise to additional concerns about the Markhams' 
credit-worthiness. Despite the Markhams' claims of having all the necessary documentation 
with them at the meeting on September 12, 2004, the date on the Credit Report proves that 
the Markhams did not request the Credit Report until September 20, 2004—eight (8) days 
after the Markhams met with Mr. Bradley to provide the financial documentation as required 
by the REPC Furthermore, the actual Personal Financial Statement that was going to be 
presented on September 12, 2004 was approximately one year old. 
Following their review of the Markham's financial documents and Credit Report, the 
Bradleys, pursuant to Section 8.1 of the SFA, and on the advice of their attorney, Robert 
Jensen, canceled the REPC in a letter dated October 4,2004. Shortly thereafter, this lawsuit 
was commenced with the Markhams seeking specific performance under the terms of the 
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REPC and asserting that the Bradleys breached the REPC as well as the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. The Bradleys defense was that the Markhams themselves were 
estopped from asserting breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing because the Markhams had failed to fully perform their obligations under the 
contract. The Bradleys also asserted that they acted in good faith and within the parameters 
of discretion in canceling the REPC based upon the unsatisfactory quality and content of the 
Markhams' credit report and financial information. 
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that the Bradleys had breached the REPC and 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court ordered specific 
performance of the terms in the REPC and forced the Bradleys to sell the Property. The 
Markahms were also awarded their attorney's fees and costs. The Bradleys filed post-trial 
motions including a Rule 62 and a Rule 52(b) motion, both of which were denied. 
II. Course of Proceedings. A two-day bench trial was held on January 24 and 25, 
2006. The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 267] were entered on 
March 14, 2006. The Final Judgment and Order was entered April 17, 2006 [K 326]. The 
Bradleys filed a Rule 62 Motion on April 27, 2006 [R 376], a Rule 59 Motion on May 1,2006 
[R403], and a Rule 52(b) Motion on May, 1, 2006 [R 415]. The trial court denied the 
Bradleys' post-trial motions in a Summary Ruling on Pending Motions on August 3, 2006 [R 
795]. On November 2,2006, the Bradleys timely filed a Notice of Appeal. [K866J 
III. Disposition at trial court. The Markhams5 principal claim as set forth in their 
complaint [R 117] was for specific performance of the terms of the REPC based upon 
theories of breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled that judgment 
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should be entered against the Bradleys and in favor of the Markhams for specific 
performance, and that the Markhams were to be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs as 
permitted by Section 17 of the REPC [K 294]. Finally, the trial court ordered that 
$30,000.00 held in escrow out of the sales price of the Property to cover the cost of 
removing rock and dirt and restoring the Property to its original condition. [K 283]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Markhams became interested in the Washington County area for a second home 
and possible early retirement area. [K 268]. 
2. The Markhams hired real estate agents Ms. Norton and Mr. Stuart Shumway 
("Shumway") to assist them in locating properties in Washington County. [R. 268]. 
3. On Friday, August 27, 2004, Ms. Ms. Norton took the Markhams out to show them 
the Washington area generally and, after viewing many properties, saw a "for sale" sign on 
the property located at 979 North Dammeron Valley Drive. [K 269]. 
4. The Markhams immediately liked the Property and asked Ms. Norton to obtain more 
information about it. [K 269]. 
5. By the next day (Saturday, August 28, 2004), Ms. Norton had pulled up the Multiple 
Listing Service ("MLS") information for the Property and saw that it was listed with an 
"owner/agent," Mrs. Bradley. [R. 269]. 
6. Ms. Norton called the number for Mrs. Bradley shown in the MLS printout, and Mr. 
Bradley, the co-owner, answered the phone. He stated that Mrs. Bradley was out of town, 
but that he could show the Property and home and agreed to show the home that Saturday 
morning. [R 269]. 
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7. On August 28, 2004, Ms. Norton and the Markhams went to the Property and met 
Mr. Bradley. [K 269]. 
8. While doing the walk-through, Mr. Bradley told the Markhams and Ms. Norton that 
his wife was out oJ town and that all contact regarding the Property should be directed 
through him and that he would pass all information and required documents on to Mrs. 
Bradley. [R 269]. 
9. Mr. Bradley escorted them through the house, showing them the improvements he 
was making, including some remodeling of the kitchen. He stated that he was a builder and 
did new home construction under the name of Pride Homes. [& 269]. 
10. The Markhams spent well over an hour at the Property with Mr. Bradley. While there: 
a. Ms. Norton asked the price, to which Mr. Bradley replied that it was listed at 
$650,000.00, but they were willing to take $550,000.00. 
b. Mr. Bradley pulled out a map of the Property, and showed them the 
boundaries of the Property and that it was already sub-divided into three 
parcels. 
c. Mr. Bradley also stated he was willing to sell some of the special-order 
furniture in the home. 
d. The Markhams told Mr. Bradley that they were interested in building one or 
two more homes for Mr. Markham's retiring brother and to allow his mother 
to live close as well. 
e. Mr. Bradley gave Mr. Markham his business card showing his business name 
and phone number. [& 270]. 
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11. While at the Property that day the Markhams developed an appreciation for the 
Property and its unique characteristics. [K 270]. 
12. After the first walk-through and after the Markhams returned to California. Mr. 
Markham then called Mr. Bradley on or about August 30, 2004 telling him that they wanted 
to buy the Property and asking what the Bradleys wanted for the Property. [K 270]. 
13. The parties agreed that the Property would be sold for $550,000.00 [K 271]. 
14. Mr. Bradley also stated he needed $265,000.00 down in order to buy out a partner, 
and that the Bradleys could cany the balance as seller financers. [R 271]. 
15. After their phone conversations, Mr. Markham called Ms. Norton to have her 
prepare a written offer in the form of a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") [Attached 
hereto as Addendum " l " ] 1 consistent with the terms Mr. Bradley and Mr. Markham had 
discussed. [K 271]. 
16. As Mr. Markham and Ms. Norton discussed the terms of the REPC, they agreed to 
include a "no prepayment penalty" and an interest rate of 5.5% on the seller-financed 
amount. [K 271]. 
17. The REPC prepared by Ms. Norton set forth a total purchase price of $550,000.00, 
with $265,000.00 cash due at closing, while permitting seller financing of $285,000.00 at 
5.5% interest on a 15-year term, requiring a $100,000.00 balloon payment at the end of the 
first year, and utilizing the standard Seller Financing Addendum. It also provided for the 
1
 All addenda provided in support of this brief are duplicates of documents that were 
submitted and accepted at trial. During trial, most of documents were submitted as "tab 1," 
"tab 2" (etc.) to Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 ultimately included 19 documents whose admissibility 
was stipulated to. For ease of reference, addenda shall merely be designated and attached in 
numerical order (i.e. Addendum " 1 , " Addendum "2," etc.). Also, Addendum " 1 " contains a 
duplicate copy of the REPC and SFA because the first copy is more legible, but the second 
copy is countersigned. 
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parties to meet in early September to discuss remodeling issues and finalize what furniture 
would stay with the house. [R 272]. 
18. Ms. Norton and Shumway presented the written REPC offer to Mr. Bradley at one of 
his construction job sites. Ms. Norton asked how they could contact Mrs. Bradley to present 
the written REPC offer to her, and Mr. Bradley told Ms. Norton that Mrs. Bradley was in 
Bellingham, Washington. [R 272]. 
19. Mr. Bradley again affirmed that he would be handling the paperwork, as it was very 
difficult to contact Mrs. Bradley. However, Mr. Bradley would not give Shumway or Ms. 
Norton any contact information for Mrs. Bradley at that time. [R 272]. 
20. Along with the REPQ Mr. Bradley also received the Seller Financing Addendum 
("SFA")2 to the REPC. However, Ms. Norton did not present the Buyer Financial 
Information Sheet (required by Section 8 of the SFA to the REPQ at that time. 
21. At the time Ms. Norton and Shumway presented the written REPC offer to Mr. 
Bradley, Ms. Norton discussed the SFA with Mr. Bradley and the fact that they did not have 
the Markhams' financial information with the offer, but would be providing it later in 
whatever form the Bradleys wanted to designate. [R 272]. 
22. Shortly after presenting the REPC to Mr. Bradley and after he had reviewed it with 
Mrs. Bradley, Mr. Bradley presented a written counteroffer back to Ms. Norton which the 
Bradleys had both signed requesting a $10,000.00 earnest money payment, increasing the 
amount of down payment by another $10,000.00, and reducing the amount of the seller 
financing to $265,000.00. The sales price of $550,000.00 and interest rate of 5.5%, as well as 
the standard terns of the Seller Financing Addendum, remained unchanged. [R 273]. 
2
 The SFA is attached after the REPC. 
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23. The Markhams signed the counteroffer, and Ms. Norton called Mr. Bradley to let him 
know. After the REPC was fully accepted and executed, the Markhams sent a check for the 
$10,000.00 earnest money deposit, which was deposited with Century 21 at the Rockies. [R 
274]. 
24. Ms. Norton delivered the fully signed REPC to Mr. Bradley around September 4, 
2004. At this time, Ms. Norton scheduled a follow-up meeting with Mr. Bradley for 
September 12. [R 274]. 
25. Ms. Norton set the date for September 12,2004 because the following day, 
(September 13) was the deadline for producing financial information. Ms. Norton discussed 
the need and purposes for the meeting with the Markhams as well as with Mr. Bradley, the 
purposes being to go over the financial information and two of the other contingency items 
listed in the REPC regarding finishing the remodeling of the home and what furniture the 
Bradleys would want to sell along with the house, as well to go over house plans for the 
other two homes the Markhams wanted to build on the Property. [R 274]. 
26. After presenting the REPQ Ms. Norton spoke with Mr. Bradley several times about 
the upcoming meeting as well as other matters. [R 274]. 
27. In one of the conversations, Mr. Bradley told Ms. Norton that he wanted to extend 
the closing time by at least a month, as he was having trouble finishing the remodeling and 
would not be able to complete it in time, asking Ms. Norton to prepare an addendum for 
him to sign. [R 274-275]. 
28. In response to Mr. Bradley's desire to extend the closing deadline, Ms. Norton 
received permission from the Markhams to extend the date and partially prepared an 
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addendum, telling Mr. Bradley that he would need to fill it out in full, sign it, and present it 
back to the Markhams, as it would be considered a counteroffer from the Bradleys. [R. 275], 
29. During this time, prior to the September 12 meeting, there were other conversations 
in person and on the phone between Ms. Norton and Mr. Bradley which were cordial. [K 
275]. 
30. In preparing for the September 12 meeting, Ms. Norton told the Markhams to bring 
financial information with them. [R. 276]. 
31. When the Markhams arrived in St. George on September 12, they first met with Ms. 
Norton in her office. Mr. Markham had a briefcase from which he pulled a stack of papers 
with his financial information at the top of the stack Ms, Norton saw the financial 
information, although she did not review it in detail at that time. [K 276]. 
32. The Markhams' financial information included three months of bank statements, a 
blank financial statement from First California Bank, and a financial statement from 
September, 2003. [TT 30:22 through 31:7]. [A copy of the "Personal Financial Statement 
and September, 2003 financial statement that the Markhams had with them on September 
12, 2004 is attached hereto as Addendum "T\ 
33. During trial Ms. Norton acknowledged that Section 8 of the SFA required that the 
Markhams provide a current consumer credit report by the Seller Disclosure Deadline 
established in Section 24(b) of the REPC (i.e. September 13,2004). [TT 188:3-21]. 
34. Although Ms. Norton had provided deposition testimony that the Markhams had a 
credit report with them on September 12, Ms. Norton subsequently altered her testimony 
and admitted she did not see a credit report during the Markhams visit on September 12. 
[TT 216:6 through 218:14]. 
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35. Mr. Markham also confirmed that Ms. Norton did not instruct him to bring a credit 
report for the meeting on September 12. [TT 72:1-15]. 
36. Later in the afternoon, the Markhams then went to the Property with Ms. Norton, 
Shumway and Mr. Markham's brother, Dirk Markham, and his wife, \K. 276]. 
37. Arriving in the later afternoon, the Markhams found Mr. Bradley at the home in an 
apparently agitated mood. [R. 276]. 
38. Ms. Norton spoke to Mr. Bradley and while she was doing this, Shumway took the 
Markhams to walk around the outside of the Property. Ms. Norton reminded Mr. Bradley 
that they did have an appointment at this scheduled time and that it was important to go 
over the financial information, the house plans, the remodeling, and the furniture issues. [K 
276]. 
39. Ms. Norton reminded Mr. Bradley that the Markhams were not only buying the 
Property, but were looking to him as the most likely builder of the two additional homes 
they wanted to build on this eight-acre parcel and that he should get control of his emotions 
and proceed with the meeting they had planned. [K 276-277]. 
40. Mr. Bradley acknowledged the appointment and the meeting and apologized to the 
Markhams. [K 277]. 
41. Inside the home, Mr. Markham set his briefcase on a table. He opened it up and took 
out his stack of papers, including financial information at the top of the stack [K 277]. 
42. Mr. Markham had information and records with him at that time, including the 
following: 
a. A prior financial statement Mr. Markham had prepared and submitted to a 
bank regarding a financial transaction unrelated to this matter, which Mr. 
13 
Markham was going to use to transfer updated information to a financial 
statement form of the Bradleys' choice. 
b. A sample form from Mr. Markham's bank that could be completed with the 
Markhams' financial information if the Bradleys decided to adopt such a form. 
Additional bank records and statements from which the Markhams could 
obtain any needed account information. 
43. Mr. Bradley indicated that it was not a good time to review any of the financial 
information and asked if the documents could be reviewed on a different day. [K 
277]. 
44. The group ended up leaving after approximately 30 minutes. [K 278]. 
45. While driving away Ms. Norton telephoned her assistant to confirm the date for the 
submission of the financial documents to the Bradleys. Ms. Norton's assistant told her that 
the deadline was September 30. [TT 186:10-18; 198:11-14]. 
46. Ms. Norton testified during trial that if she would have known the submission date 
was September 13, she would have "gone back in." [IT 186:13-14; 197:3-10; 198:17-21]. 
Ms. Norton believed that the Markhams had a "couple of weeks" to provide the Credit 
Report and other financial information. [TT 152:12]. 
47. Ms. Norton also said if she would have realized the correct deadline, she would have 
served Mr. Bradley with the necessary financial information. [TT 222:20-22]. 
48. The Markhams did not leave any of the financial information they had brought with 
Ms. Norton when they returned to California on September 13 because Ms. Norton believed 
they had until September 30 to submit the financial information [TT 219:16-20]; nor did the 
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Markhams request that Ms. Norton obtain a credit report and deliver the credit report to the 
Bradleys. [TT 87:10-25]. 
49. Mr. Markham did not instruct Ms. Norton to make any further attempt to deliver the 
financial documents after the September 12 meeting. [TT 97:22]. 
50. Ms. Norton did not verify whether the September 13 deadline was correct, even though 
she received the Seller Disclosures from the Bradleys on September 13. [TT 203:7-15; 
204:14-17]. 
51. Between September 13 and September 20, Ms. Norton twice stopped by one of Mr. 
Bradley's construction sites and left a card, although Mr. Bradley was not present. [IT 
156:2-9]. 
52. Later during that week, Ms. Norton also attempted to call Mr. Bradley "once or 
twice." [IT 156:11]. 
53. Mr. Markham did not receive any of the alleged calls from Ms. Norton. He had 
driven to Las Vegas to pick up Mrs. Bradley who had flown in on September 17. [TT 286:4-
12]. 
54. Following Mrs. Bradley's return from Washington, the Bradleys discussed their 
concerns that they had not received a Credit Report or other financial documents from the 
Markhams. [TT 286:13 through 287:4; 341:9-16]. 
55. When the Bradleys returned to St. George on September 19, they had still not 
received any financial information from the Markhams. [TT 341:3-8]. 
56. On September 20, Mrs. Bradley drafted and faxed a letter indicating that the Bradleys 
were canceling the REPC because the Markhams had failed to provide the required financial 
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information by September 13. [K 278]. [The September 20, 2004 letter is attached hereto as 
Addendum "3"]. 
57. On or about September 22, Ms. Norton called Mrs. Bradley (who had returned to 
Washington), and left a message. Mrs. Bradley returned the call the same day, at which time 
Ms. Norton asked her what she felt it would take to make the deal work [R 279]. [Ti' 
343:14]. 
58. Ms. Norton asked Mrs. Bradley if the deal could be "saved" and admitted that she 
thought that the Marldiams had until September 30 to "work it out." Ms. Norton stated that 
she would "take the blame for that" and then stated that the Markhams "had everything" 
with them September 12 (although as indicated supra, the Markhams did not have the Credit 
Report ready to submit on September 12). [TT 158:13-24]. 
59. Mrs. Bradley stated that she did not want to sell the Property, and that she would 
only give the Markhams a right of first refusal. [TT 158:15-16]. 
60. Ms. Norton explained that she had obtained the Credit Report, the updated Personal 
Financial Statement and supporting documentation, and Mrs. Bradley asked Ms. Norton to 
fax them over for review. [343:9-14]. 
61. Ms. Norton also called Mr. Bradley. [R 279]. The conversation was not 
confrontational, and Mr. Bradley simply said he could not help. [TT 159:10-14]. 
62. The Markhams refused to accept the Bradleys' attempt to cancel the REPC. [R. 279]. 
63. After learning of the September 20 letter, the Markhams contacted Countrywide 
Home Loans ("Countrywide"). Countrywide printed a credit report and began processing a 
loan application for the Property in case it was needed. [K 280]. 
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64. Mr. Markham began updating the financial statement he had used for an earlier bank 
loan, but, because of the rush to get the information in as quickly as possible, he was unable 
to locate a blank form and had to use white-out to update the various figures on a previously 
used form in order to provide current information. [K 280]. 
65. On September 24, Ms. Norton prepared and faxed a letter [attached hereto as 
Addendum "4"] to the Bradleys stating that the Markhams rejected the Bradleys' attempt to 
cancel the REPC 
66. Ms. Norton also sent the Credit Report [attached hereto as Addendum "5"] and an 
updated "Personal Financial Statement [attached hereto as Addendum "6"] with the 
September 24 letter. 
67. Among other things, the September 24 letter informed the Bradleys that the 
Markhams had been prequalified to fully pay the purchase price and were ready, willing, and 
able to close under the REPC. [R. 280]. 
68. Mr. Bradley did not receive the September 24 letter, Credit Report and updated 
Personal Financial Statement until September 27. [IT 289:18-22] 
69. Mr. Bradley took the letter and information with him when he flew to Washington on 
September 27 to pick Mrs. Bradley up. Mrs. Bradley reviewed the information at that time. 
[TT 344:9-11]. 
70. Ms. Norton (not realizing that the September 24 letter and accompanying 
information had not been received by Mr. Bradley until September 27) faxed another letter 
dated September 27, 2004 [attached hereto as Addendum "7"]. 
71. Mr. Bradley called Ms. Norton and left a message on September 30,2004 that she 
should direct all further communications to their attorney, Robert M. Jensen. By September 
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30, the Markhams had received formal notification from Countrywide that they were 
approved for a loan on the Property. On September 30, Ms. Norton faxed a letter to the 
Bradleys and their attorney with a copy of this notification from Countrywide. [R. 280]. 
[The September 30, 2004 letter is attached hereto as Addendum "8"]. [The Countrywide 
notification is attached hereto as Addendum "9,yJ. 
72. The Bradleys received and reviewed all letters and the financial information. They 
then met with Mr. Jensen and instructed him to send another notice to cancel the REPC [K 
281]. 
73. Mr. Jensen sent a letter dated October 4, 2004 [attached hereto as Addendum "10"] 
stating that his clients would not close on the REPC, claiming that the Bradleys were 
excused from doing so because they had not received the financial information by 
September 13. He also indicated that the financial information they received was difficult to 
read and of poor fax quality, the pages seemed out of order, and that the Bradleys were 
uncomfortable with a reference to a bankruptcy or judgment; therefore they were canceling 
the REPC. [K 281]. 
74. The Credit Report sent to and received by the Bradleys shows a credit score of 689 
for Mr. Markham and 705 for Mrs. Markham. It also shows references to full on-time 
payments with four instances of late payments, all four being 30 days late, two times in 2003 
and two times in 2001. The reference to the bankruptcy or judgment was from reference to 
Mr. Markham's filing bankruptcy approximately ten years earlier in relation to a business deal 
in a shared chiropractic office. [K 281]. 
75. No expert witness was called to establish whether the Markhams' credit scores were 
good or poor. [R 282]. 
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76. The REPC provides for the prevailing party to be awarded attorneys' fees and costs. 
[R 282]. 
77. Testimony at trial also established that it would cost approximately $30,000.00 to 
have the dirt, rock, and debris that had been stored by the Bradleys removed from the 
Property. Therefore, the trial court deemed it appropriate to hold $30,000.00 in escrow out 
of the sales price of the Property to cover the cost of removing all of the rock and debris 
and restoring the Property to its original condition. [K 283]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in holding that defendants breached the duty to act in good 
faith, waived and were estopped from asserting their right to rely on the September 13 
deadline, and were entitled to specific performance. 
The Bradleys did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they 
were reasonable in refusing to loan $265,000.00 to an individual with a prior bankruptcy. 
The Utah Supreme court has recently clarified its covenant of good faith jurisprudence to 
ensure that the covenant is closely tied to the expectations of the parties and the plain 
language of the contract from which the covenant arises. The covenant cannot create new 
rights or eliminate existing rights for the contracting parties. A court may not use to 
covenant of good faith to force a party to act against that party's detriment and for the 
benefit of the other party. 
The plain language of the SFA specifically allowed the Bradley's to review the 
Markhams' financial information and cancel the REPC if they were dissatisfied in anyway 
with contents of that inf omiation. This language indicates that the appropriate standard to 
determine whether the Bradleys acted in good faith is whether they were subjectively 
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dissatisfied with the Markhams' financial information. The trial court erred when it applied 
an objective reasonable standard to evaluate the Bradleys' conduct and equated the Bradleys' 
tolerance for risk with that of a professional third party lender. 
The Bradleys did not waive their right to rely on the Markhams' failure to submit the 
required financial documents by the September 13 deadline as grounds to cancel the R E P C 
Waiver requires a party to intentionally relinquish a right. For a party to waive a right, the 
party must clearly and distinctly communicate waiver of that right to the other party 
The actions and testimony of the parties in the present case prove that neither party 
understood Mr. Bradley's actions on September 12 to waive the Bradleys' right to rely on the 
September 13 deadline. The Bradleys submitted the required Seller Disclosures on 
September 13, pursuant to the terms of the SFA, indicating that they did not intend to waive 
reliance on that date. The Markhams' agent, Ms. Norton, indicated that she would have fully 
performed on the September 13 deadline, but she mistakenly believed that the deadline was 
September 30 rather than September 13. Because the actions of both parties clearly 
demonstrates that neither believed that Mr. Bradley's conduct on September 12 waived the 
Bradleys right to rely on the September 13 deadline, Mr. Bradley could not have intentionally 
and clearly waived the right to strictly enforce the September 13 deadline. 
The Bradleys should not be estopped from strictly enforcing the September 13 
deadline for financial disclosures because the Markhams were not relying on Mr. Bradley's 
conduct when they failed to provide the required financial documents on September 13. An 
essential element of a claim for estoppel is reliance. The Markhams' agent, Ms. Norton, 
testified that the reason the Markhams failed to provide the required financial information by 
September 13 was because she erroneously believed the deadline was September 30. 
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Undisputed testimony establishes that the Markhams were relying on their mistaken 
understanding of the REPC rather than on Mr. Bradleys' conduct and the trial court 
13 deadline. 
I 'inally, SJAVHK p^  iiormance is not the appropriate remedy for this case because the 
Markha iii s had not f i i 1 !:> performs d thei i obi igations i J ndei the R EPC 
ARGUMENT 
I. The "Trial Coun r u n ive reasonableness1"' legal SMIKIJI il 
for breach of the c »* fair dealing because the plain 
language of the R] be subjectively dissatisfied 
with the Markhams' credit an<! because i le\s* motivations for refusing 
to loan money 10 the Markhams i^  irrek van \o -,\ briber the Bradleys acted in 
good faith. 
The scope of the covena nt of good fa ith and fai i: dea .1 iiig; Is close!) tied to the 
language of the contract and expectations of the contracting parties.3 In undertaking its 
analysi. o\ the covenant of goot; unu lin a.«J , J U K ii. „ii;, case committed i^ vo reversible 
errors r^r.rdin^4!^ !:*:-•! iruui r j ^ l i n ; : . " . " r '•""' ^'- ! ' > -, the 1 J ialcoi J i t 
erroneously concluded that the appropriate legal standard for the .REPC was objective 
reasonableness, l l ie plain language oi u.<- \\\-\\ i>n\x requiKu inn; ilu iSraJley's be 
subjectively dissatisfied with the Markhams' end i, - .• | " '•( 1* * •• r 
to apply an objective reasonableness standard to the REPC Second, the trial court 
improperly considered the Bradley 's possible alternate e motives for cancelling the contract. 
The Bradley's motivations for cancelling the contract were irrelevant to the question of 
3
 Appellants assert that thb issue is a legal conclusion subject to a correction of error 
standard. However, il this Court: determines that the Issue is one of fact, Appellants have 
marshaled evidence related to this issue in Section II of this brief. 
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whether they were subjectively dissatisfied with the Markhams1 financial information, thus, 
the trial court erred by introducing an irrelevant factor in its breach of good faith analysis. 
A. The trial court applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether 
the Bradleys breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The scope of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited by well-settled 
principles. Oakmod Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,145, 104 P.3d 1226. Courts 
may not use the covenant to establish new, independent rights to which the parties did not 
agree at the time they made an agreement. Id. The covenant cannot create duties inconsistent 
with express contractual terms. Id. The covenant cannot force a party to exercise a right "to 
its own detriment for the purpose of benefiting another party to the contract" Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). Finally a court cannot use the covenant as a tool to achieve an outcome 
consistent its individual notions of fairness, but inconsistent with the express terms of the 
applicable contract. Id. 
Generally, the covenant of good faith requires a party to refrain from acting in a way 
that injures the other party's contract benefits. St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,199 (Utah 1991). Thus, to comply with the covenant of good faith a 
party must act in accordance with "the agreed common purpose and the justified 
expectations of the other party" Ramon v. Conover^ 2001 UT 24, % 44, 20 P.3d 876. 
The case of Oakmod Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 1226, 
illustrates that the terms of the contract and parties' course of conduct limit the scope of the 
covenant of good faith. Oakmod Village involved a lease between a developer and a different 
grocery store—Albertsons. Oakmod Village, 2004 UT at Tj 3. An Albertson's store closed the 
store on the leased property and opened a store in a nearby location. Id. at f 5. Albertsons 
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continued paying rent under the original lease. Id. at % 6. The Albertson's lease did not 
contain a provision requiring Albertson's to continually operate a business on the property. 
Id. at % :1 9 Instead of altering the bi isiiiess nati ire ot the lea sed location, A lbertsons 
permanently closed the groceiy store on the leased property but continued to pay rent under 
the lease, Albertson's relocation and closure harmed the de\: eloper's property value by 
prevent! iig the de\ eloper from fi iicii rig a replacement grocery store to atti act ci istomers foi 
other stores on the property. Id. at j^ 42. The developer argued that Albertson's conduer, 
even if it did no; \ ^iaw me express terms of the lease, violated the covenant of good iaai. 
and fair dealing by denying the developer the opportn i n ity tc attract ci istomers to its • 
property Id. The I Jtah Supreme Court, noting that the covenant of good faith is limited by 
: joining comra^L, i«;ia a:» a matter wi u* -n.*. ,.^ vieveiopei iaikd to state 
a claim for breach of good faith because the lease did not did no* r n. ii . "]. * * •. 
continuously operate a business on the property. Id. at ff 45, 53. The court concluded that 
• :-•• i u:iu,uainj w a:- .lea: unc mat ann^ugn ,\iiK,rrson s ac t ion damage! the •. aUt;. :r.-,\ 
profitability of the developer's property, as a matter of law Albertson's had not breached the 
covenant of good faith. Id. at 1^ n i. See also Olympus Hills Shopping Centery Ltd. v. Smith's Food 
i- lhv£ Centers, ///,., 88V 1\,\| 4^> (I lull , \pp !VlHj. 
The principle established in Oakwood Village is that the scope of the duty to act in 
good faith is carefully tied to the terms of the contract underlying a dispute. Where there is 
lie contr actual provision requiring a d\ it) , a court wil I n :>t i e v\ rite the contract in favor of the 
complaining party. 
In the instant case, the trial court .improperly expanded the covenant of good faith to 
eliminate the Brae • :u< ; ..: - .n h]i\i uu Aiarui.im 's credit. fhe court used the 
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covenant of good faith as a tool to achieve an outcome consistent with its own notions of 
fairness but inconsistent with the terms of the contract. 
Section 8.1 of the seller finance addendum to the REPC grants the Bradleys wide 
latitude to review and reject the Markhams' credit: 
If the content of the credit report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable 
to Seller, Seller may elect to either: (a) provide written objections to Buyer as 
provided [elsewhere in the contract]; or (b) immediately cancel the REPC by 
providing written notice to Buyer.... [Addendum "1"]. 
This provision of the SFA does not specify any standard by which the Seller may assess 
the Buyer's credit. To the contrary, it grants complete discretion to the Seller. Importantly, 
the provision does not require the credit information to satisfy a third party lender or a 
hypothetical, objective reasonableness standard. It requires only that the credit information 
satisfy the Seller (the Bradleys). The trial court ignored this broad discretion and imposed an 
exacting scrutiny on the Bradleys' decision to reject the Markhams' credit. The proper legal 
standard for the trial court was whether the Bradleys were subjectively satisfied with the 
Markham's credit, not whether a reasonable third party lender would have been satisfied 
with the Markham's credit. 
The trial court noted that the Markhams qualified for a loan through a professional 
third party lending company (Countrywide). Based upon this qualification, the trial court 
concluded that it was objectively unreasonable for the Bradleys to cancel the REPC even 
though the Markhams' financial information included a prior bankruptcy judgment, a tax 
lien, numerous late payments, and was in sloppy condition. [K 288-290]. The trial court did 
acknowledge that there was a bankruptcy judgment against the Markhams, but because 
Countrywide would have loaned money to the Markhams, it decided that the Bradleys 
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should have felt secure in financing $265,000.00 to individuals who had previously filed for 
bankruptcy B\ Uoseh scrutinizing the Bradleys' decision to not loan money to the 
M.irkh.mv, -ind comparing then dn isiou in ih it nl ,I ilmul |u t tv lender, tin in.il mini 
expanded the scope of the covenant of good faith beyond the terms of the SFA and the 
expectations of the parties. 
The plain language of \<vn " '• * K~]- '• \ l Usvulh-w -. . ^ ',;i •• ,-
subjective judgment in. determining whether to extend credit to the Markhams. Conversely, 
the trial court purported i.. lu.,,; \\^ iMadim-. h> an "i^jccuvc standard, but based its ruliilg 
on its own subjective reasoning. It granted no deference to the Brae Hey sy legiti mate reasons 
for refusing to extend credit to the .Markhams and replaced their reasonable decision with its 
o * 11,' I Ih is v iolated the express pro visions oi the contract ^.,. me expectations of the partres. 
The trial court compares the Bradleys—who had never previously financed a real 
estate transaction i< * Oxintrywide—-an established, experienced, professional lender. This 
i :i nfairl} pitted ti- l*-\v:^ ;55 toiei ance for :i *i sk again si: that of a professional lender vv itii years 
of experience, Countrywide has been in the financial industry since 1969 (nearh 4C -: ) 
and is a publicly traded company The Bradleys, on. the other hand, have comparatively little 
regularly reviewed his own credit report, but has no other experience reviewing credit 
.reports. [Tl 308:20-309:7]. At trial, he could recall the name of two out of the three major 
credit reporting companies [TI '31 0:1 25] I fe also did not clear i) understand Mi 
Markham's credit report. [ I T 325:10-25 (testifying that he did not understand basic elements 
of Mr. Markham's credit report)]. Although purporting to evaluate the rationality'of the 
.1 iradley s review of the Markhams' cred it information i inder an objective reasonableness 
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standard, the court imposed a reasonable professional lender's experience as the standard. 
The professional and corporate entity status of Countiywide makes its tolerance for 
risks and scrutiny when lending very different from the financial and emotional risks 
involved when an individual or family decides to lend money The Bradleys risk their own 
personal wealth and livelihood by lending money unlike Countrywide which is structured to 
absorb such risks. 
The plaintiffs do not deny the negative facts in their financial and credit information. 
The prior bankruptcy, tax lien, late payments, and sloppy condition of the Markhams' 
financial information are enough to justify the Bradleys' decision to not loan the Markhams 
$265,000. The trial court ignored these facts and used the covenant of good faith to reach a 
result consistent with its own notions of fairness, but inconsistent with the terms of the 
contract. 
The trial court also ruled that the Bradleys' concerns over the sloppiness and poor 
quality of the Markham's financial information elevated form over substance. This 
conclusion fails to consider that the Markhams' late, hastily assembled, sloppy, handwritten 
financial information indicates a pattern of disorganization that creates an emotional stress 
for the Bradley's. A professional third party lender such as Countrywide has employees who 
are trained and prepared to deal with late payments, non-standard reporting forms, and 
disorganized financials. The Bradleys could not reasonably hire an employee to handle such 
administrative challenges throughout the life of the loan and would be compelled to deal 
with the Markham's on a personal and intimate level on a monthly basis if they personally 
financed the home. Accordingly, the Bradleys were legitimately concerned these problems 
might continue or become worse through the life of the loan if they decided to proceed with 
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financing. Such emotional stress and conflict might be imm.ate.rial for Countrywide '"who 
i-\pf- i. pi,i; <i .< .. v. ..iLiiCi-., nu - i t was certauiiv a lc^iiimate anc. jLL»uli«ii)le 
concern for the Bradleys. 
The trial court mistakenly relies on the Markhams' being "pre-qualified" for a loan 
executed ^ r that run* MUII in the pre-qualification letter will become money in the b a n k As 
such, neither the mai court, no r the Bradleys should have relied, on such preliminary 
,:i :o formation as a basis to evaluate the credit ol the Markhams 
Further, the trial court 's decision to specifically enforce 'the R E P C forced the 
wi auk ^ to act against their best interests and assume the risk of loaning money to the 
'-I.iHd- i act, i oiiiradirti-^; r • slalnl in < W/ /w, I , «. j . , •. • .-[IberhoHs, /"//,,, luv4 
f
 "T KM, % 45, 104 P.3d 1226. The Markhams had a prior banknim^v, less than perfect credit, 
a tax lien on record, and numerous and recent late payments tciitx led in their accounts. The 
H»urf i < *!• :.-.«i ; MT-'\ I'laiiiuv; iiio(ic\ in - ... *h.wii-. i tuainsttheirintei est, tor 
the benefit of the Alarkliains. 
i in* case is similar to ( )JKWOOCI i iliage where the court dismissed uie ciaiiu lor breach 
of good, faith heca/i ise !'\ Lbertson's cond i ict \K a s w ith i n the scope of appropriate action 
defined by the contract. Like Albertson's lease in Oakwood I 'iliage which contained no 
provision u www niuiLaia; a hiw,,,, udty to act in the leaseholder^ best interest, there is no 
duty lis ted in the REPCorSFA , here, wh ich woi ;i Id implicate abi oadduty tc > o verk ok the 
negative aspects of the Markhams" credit to save the contract. Thus, as a matter of law, the 
scope of the Bradleys' duty to act in good faith did not require them to act in a manner 
consistent with that of a professional lendei or to take on a cred it risk when the REI *C 
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allowed them discretion to review and reject the Markhams credit history. 
Defendants had a right to exercise discretion and the trial court improperly replaced 
that right and discretion with its own judgment. This court should reverse the trial court's 
determination that an objective reasonableness standard was the appropriate legal standard 
to determine whether the Bradleys' breached the covenant of good faith. 
B. The Bradleys' motivation for canceling the contract is irrelevant to 
whether they acted in good faith because dissatisfaction with the 
Markhams' credit information alone justified cancellation of the REPC. 
In contract law, the requirement that a person exercise discretion in good faith 
generally does not refer to a person's motivations for acting, but to the rationality, 
reasonableness, fairness, or propriety of the person's actions under the terms of the contract 
and in light of the parties' expectations. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a. 
If a party acts rationally and pursuant to the contract terms, the party's motivations for 
taking action are irrelevant. It is enough that the person acted according to the terms of the 
contract. 
A hypothetical scenario illustrates the forgoing principle: a seller contracts to convey 
property to a buyer. The seller agrees to finance the transaction and includes a seller 
financing addendum to the contract with a seller review clause identical to the clause in the 
present case. The price of the land increases dramatically between the time the parties signed 
the sales contract and the financial disclosure deadline. The seller will have obvious 
motivation to cancel the contract and the buyer will have obvious motivation to enforce the 
contract. The buyer makes his financial disclosures and turns out to have the worst possible 
credit. Elated, the seller cancels the contract and provides written notice to the buyer 
pursuant to the contract. 
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Tn ihe hypothetical, the seller was partially motivated to cancel the contract for 
reasons cmci man UK inn LT s poor credit, hm the seJici did not exercise their discretion in 
bad faith. The buyer's poor credit was .v it diTiemlei .. uH .\: ;n I.MS .= • } : • . a 
canceling the contract regardless of the Seller's motivation to cancel. Thus, the rationality of 
: *. I.-. • •» j .. J..-..:- . i r i i k . .. . ^biacraii, ; :); , , .n u ri^miiiig wiietiiLi the 
seller breached the covenant of good faith and any alternative motivations lor cane* linj;; t h<* 
contract are irrelevant. 
In the present case, the coi :i :i I: foi J nd that the Bi adlej s cancelled the contract because 
they wanted to back out of the sale and used the Markham's credit as pretext to disguise a 
desire to renege on the R E P C As illustrated by the hypothetical above, the Bradleys' 
motivations for canceling the contract shoi :i lei not i: ela te to the c o v eiiaiit of good faith. 
Rather, the sole consideration should be whether the negative elements of the Markhams' 
financial information justified the Bradleys' decision to cancel the contract. Even if the 
Bradleys were partial [y motivated to cancel the contract f 01 reasons other than the 
Markham's credit, the contract gave them discretion to accept or reject the Markhams' credit 
iniormation aitd n iliey acted rationally, they did not breach 'the covenant of good faith. The 
l! I ;il M nil f \ ron< lush >n (hit! ihc liiadln s used the Markhams' i rah l ;^ prelect (o Liiim I I In 
contract is not sufficient to support its conclusion that the Bradleys acted in bad faith given 
the undisputed and material negative facts relating to the Markhams' credit. 
ri ie trial court erred by fail my in VJAIII llic llratllcvs1 imillion li,ni ,n (lira it:tl 
verdict and motion for a new uiaL 
A court should reverse the trial court's denial of a directed verdict if a reasonable 
•.. - • • • ot disagree on the issue. .\L\.;O;^: P. BM/;,. DO- . .~d . i-:.. . .. ^ 'un 
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The appellate court reviews the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. When challenging a denial of a directed verdict, a 
party is required to "marshal the evidence" and demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict. When reviewing a motion for a new 
trial the reviewing court uses an abuse of discretion standard. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 
P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991). 
Drawing conclusions and inferences from the above-stated evidence in favor of the 
verdict, the evidence is nonetheless insufficient to support a verdict for a breach of the 
covenant of good faith. Thus, even if the trial court used the appropriate standard for 
evaluating the Bradleys' decision to cancel the contract, reasonable minds could not disagree 
that the Bradleys breached the covenant of good faith. 
Marshaled Evidence 
'"Whether the implied covenant of good faith performance was breached.. .is a fact-
intensive inquiry, ordinarily left for the fact-finder." Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, 
Inc., 2000 UT App. 121,1f 23,1 P.3d 570. 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, "[a]n appellant 
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight 
of the evidence." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). See also West Valley City v. Majesticlnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). 
The trial court found that it "was unreasonable for the Bradleys to reject the 
Markhams" credit worthiness based on the documents presented to them. The Bradleys did 
30 
not rely on credit worthiness issues. Rather, their "evaluation" was a pretext, to cancel the 
Kiil'i because they had already changed their minds about selling. Tins was in brcach of the 
implied covenant of"*>. >.». * 1 mt 1 • -;..--r I'-.iiiii;.' jK. • . -i- i. ..• 
"fact" sets in determining that die Bradleys breached the covenant nt good faith and fair 
dealing, |R. 288-2<Sl'|. "Ilie iindings of KILL au i uic tnalcourt rvmd vii auu the marshaled 
evidence c,!pportini!; those findings are: 
f1) In rejecting Air. Bradley testified that he expected the credit report to be from iCExperiany" one oj the 
three majo? credit reporting agencies, and not the iCLandsafe" company shown on the front oj the 
credit report, yet while on the witness stand, Mr. Bradley acknowledged that the credit report did 
show the Experian credit score on both of the Markhams and that the credit information was 
gathered fro!,. ]yxpcnan. 
••• Mr. Bradir iesii*W - VV-.Y • '-•• -
 : !!. - • << •,-;>•- 1 
was from "Landsafe" (see Addendum "5", hereto with the language "Landsafe 
M U . ; . — -V> iu;>>.:; ,n *<^  ; >\>, and not one oi 11ic three major credit 
repo^me a;:rnnV-; (like F.v.nmir' \ \ ;h'. - •• *. I . ^.; ,^MIII,; "..it 
XPN, TUC and EXF were listed on the Credit. Report:. Mr. Bradley stated he 
(IKI noi know what those acronyms stood i^. -iu ^ ,K u anally reviewed the 
Credit Report. [TT 309:8 through 312:1 2]., 
(2) The Markhams' credit scores of 689 and 705 were sufficient for Countrywide to qualify the 
*/,//A//^"/.» /</ * '. a, ;oi iiiic, iw amount that the Bradleys agreed to finance. I conclude that it 
would not be objectively reasonable for the Bradleys to claim this as , / "mnvd to ,; wcel ///< * K \ i IV 
See Addendum "5" (Credit Report) and Addendum 9 (Countrywide Letter). 
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The Bradley's both testified that one of the most important elements in their decision to reject the 
financial information was that it was handwritten on the form and looked sloppy and that they 
would not present such a sloppy form to anyone in seeking credit for themselves, yet they testified that 
they had no objection to the information on the report showing the Markhams' monthly income or 
their net worth or their credit scores. I conclude that this objection to the form or appearance of the 
Markhams' papers had nothing to do with the merits of the information provided to them, so that it 
was objectively unreasonable for the Bradleys to reject the Markhams'financial information on this 
basis. 
• Mr. Bradley testified that the poor quality of the Credit Report bothered him. 
[TT 312:20 through 313:3]. 
• Mrs. Bradley testified that the poor quality of the Credit Report bothered her. 
[TT 345:6-19]. 
• Mrs. Bradley specifically noted that the substantive contents of the Credit 
Report and the failure to timely deliver required documents were concerning. 
[TV 344:22 through 345:19]. 
The Bradleys also testified that they had a concern as to whether the Markhams could meet a 
monthly payment obligation if they could not meet the REPC deadline to furnish the financial 
information, yet the Markhams had shown the Bradleys that the Bradleys would not need to carry 
the note for any extended period of time, as the Markhams had lined up Countrywide to immediately 
pay off the seller financing, completely eliminating that claimed concern. 
• See Addendum "5" (Credit Report) and Addendum "9" (Countrywide Letter). 
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• Mrs, Bradley expressed concern as to whether the \'!.irkh,i 11 - .\ • !-. - ) ke 
monthly payments given the failure to timely submit essential documents. [TT 
34 I,1- IS, UIJ.I IV>b2.ll li»|. • 
• ]\ Ir Brad le) expressed concern as to whether the Markham s wou id ma ke 
monthly payments given the failure to timel) submit essential documents. [I T 
290:14 22; 292:2. 11; 293:13 18]. 
' The credit report show. s only four historical delinquencie r, all k /;< un:\ > -^<ij, delinauet. • 
two of them showing the last delinquency date in 2003 and two of them showing the last delinquency 
date in 2001 \ which is a very small and insignificant number of delinquencies in comparison to the 
many timely payments. 
• See Addendum "5" (Credit Report). 
In the "Notice of Cancellation" from their attorney, the Bradleysy only specific comment on the merits 
of the Mark ha/i'\ .7 ,/// iwn'- "...» >>•• ,uu,.\ .v> • -- t//\n/p/t) m ///ug/uen,,'" 'The 
evidence established that Countrywide did not consider this ten or twelve-year old bankruptcy to 
disqualify the Markhams from a loan for twice the amount that the Bradleys agreed to finance. 
1 furthermore, \4.rs B; ; id ley J broker testified that she nt we} in*. mtioned a banki uptcy to him until just 
before their depositions were taken. I conclude that it was not objectively reasonable for the Bradleys 
to claim this as aground to cancel the REPC support of its finding of waiver. 
' • ' S i t \ i •• . • » • - . i v j i i v ! i r o i u . • : . . V : J S C : I 
• See Addendi HTI "9." (Coi intry wide I ett er). 
• Mr. Roger Hamlin testified that Mrs, Bradley was initially concerned 
about the untimely delivery ol the iinancial documents, and 
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subsequently raised her concern about the issue of bankruptcy. [TT 
361:8 through 364:7]. 
The Trial Court's Conclusion was Against the Cleat Weight of the Evidence, 
There is no precise standard that defines the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
("covenant of good faith" or "covenant"). The covenant is a flexible concept that is has 
sometimes been used inconsistently. See Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, f 40, 94 
P.3d 193 (Nehring J. concurring). Recently however, the Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently limited the scope of the covenant of good faith to the express terms of the 
contract and expectations of the parties. Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions, 2003 UT 57, \ 20, 
84 P.3d 1154 ("the degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of the 
covenant turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have defined their expectations 
and imposed limitations on contract terms."). Section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts 
notes that "good faith performance of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed 
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party," and 
that a breach of good faith contradicts "community standards of decency, fairness, and 
reasonableness." 
Applying these legal principles to the marshaled facts, a reasonable person could not 
disagree that the Bradleys' decision to cancel the REPC, based on legitimate concerns over 
the Markham's financial information, was undertaken in good faith. The single fact that the 
Markhams had a bankruptcy on their credit justifies the Bradley's decision to cancel the 
REPC At trial, the Markhams testified that the bankruptcy was remote and unrelated to 
their present credit situation, but never testified that they communicated this information to 
the Bradleys. The Bradleys based their decision purely on the contents of the Markhams' 
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financial documents. It is obvious that a person who has gone through bankruptcy presents 
a significant credit risk As previously noted, this risk implicated the Bradleys' own personal 
assets i athertha n those of a corporate entit) ; B) lendi ng money to the A larkhams, the 
Bradleys risked their quality of lite and financial solvency Because the presence of a 
bankruptcy judgment alone on the Markhams credit justifies the Bradleys' decision to cancel 
the R EPC tl ie coi it: t si 101 ilcl ha\ e grante d the 1 irad leys'' motion for a di rected \ erdict. 
Additionally the fact that the Bradleys obtained an objective opinion from a licensed 
attorney familial with contractual duties and obligations prior to canceling the REPC 
demonstrates good faith action t :i iiclc -• - * • - h e SF i\ \ d \ ice of < . > : at "s 
that the Bradleys' actions were rational An experienced, disinterested third ™?rv advised the 
liiadicvs iudi Liic bankruptcy, tax lien, late payments, and other negative laciuai informaiion 
attorney's expertise when deciding to cancel the contract. They were not acting from 
improper motivations when they canceled the REPQ they were relying on an experienced 
attorney s objecth e legal advice 
The fact that the Bradleys reviewed the Markham's credit information even after'the 
Markhams' missed the required contract deadlines indicates the Bradleys' good faith action. 
1 )nrl>y noli tied flic Marl! KUI is < »f thv B radio 'S intent to ram el the KTPi ' based i >u I IK 
Markhams5 failure to provide the required financial disclosures at the appropriate deadlines. 
Upon .receiving this notification, the Markhams attempted to contact; Darby, and when she 
i:eti lrned thei i: cal I, she agreed to rev iew the Mark hams cred it information despite it bei ng 
late. Mrs. Bradley was not required to review then* credit, but nonetheless reviewed the 
Markhams' credit and paid an attorney to help the Bradleys evaluate the Markhams5 credit. 
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The Bradlevs' willingness to review the Markhams' financial information indicates good faith 
performance under the contract. 
Apart from the bankruptcy there are many other undisputed, negative elements of 
the Markhams' credit information that justified the Bradley's decision to not loan the 
Markhams $265,000. There are various late payments reflected in the Markhams' financial 
information. Importantly, the late payments were quite recent, indicating possible problems 
with the Markham's current financial situation. There was also a tax lien on the report. Mr. 
Markham testified that he had the tax lien removed, but never mentioned this fact to the 
Bradleys. Although Mr. Markham was always very confident about his credit when speaking 
to the Bradleys and the Bradleys were careful to closely scrutinize the substance of the 
Markham's credit rather than taking Mr. Markhams' word at face value. 
Finally, the late, disorganized, handwritten, and heavily revised condition of the 
financial information tends to confirm the Bradley's suspicion that the Markhams' presented 
a credit risk The unofficial and untrustworthy nature of Mr. Markham's hand-written 
documents appeared to confirm the Bradleys' suspicions that the Markhams' were 
irresponsible with their credit. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that the whited-out 
and handwritten portions of the Markham's financial information were flat-out dishonest. If 
not dishonest, the informal aspect of the documents certainly supports the Bradleys' 
conclusion that the Markhams maintained a similarly informal attitude toward full and timely 
payments. 
In sum, the undisputed evidence presented by the Markhams squarely supports the 
Bradley's reluctance to loan money to the Markhams. Although a person with a high 
tolerance for risk might agree to personally loan $265,000.00 to a buyer with a prior 
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bankruptcy, tax lien, and recent late payments appearing on decidedly late and informal 
financial documents, it would certainly be more reasonable to seek a less risky opportunity 
in this case because the Markhams5 financial information was informally presented, 
contained a bankruptcy judgment, a tax lien, and evidence of recent late payments. 
- i.v. Bradleys did inof w uivr llinn rnjlil In sliirlh, rnlnn v llur Scpinnbn i ( \ . 
aeadline. 
To establish waiver, a part)7" must show: (1) an existing right, (2) knowledge of its 
existence, and (3) i i •• • • • • - • ; r ; n ; m , -MC* :• IL. ;. ; hwcra rca. ,)ar. c~ L^J/; L , ny 
357 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). Each element of the test must be met in order for there to 
be an effective waiver. Whether a trial court: applied the correct legal standard in an analysis 
( "' . • . . • I: lowevri, i:. <u . •; *..ii anege uly supporting 
waiver are facti tal in nature, thus a reviewing court must grant "broadened discretion to the 
trial court's [factual] findings/5 Urn fed Park City Mines Co. v. S tichtingMajflower Mountain Vonds^ 
20061 IT 35, f 21 1,4 01 • 3d 1 200, 
When the element of intent is determinative, the appellants must marshal all 
evidence .in support of that finding. I Jnited Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
hmui\\ 2U0h i IT V\\ ?.•>, i III V \A i ">()(l When < I in I longing a liial u»utt"s huttings oi fact, 
[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking 
in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making 
them'clearly erroneous;' In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1 W 
The first two elements of waiver—the existence of a right and knowledge of its 
existence—are rarely controverted and easily understood. As long as the party actually had 
the right, and knew they possessed the right, the first t v\< o elements are met. f ) nited Park City 
3 7 
Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 23, 140 R3d 1200 (Utah 2006). 
Litigation most often arises in relation to the third element—intent to relinquish the 
right. When deciding whether a party intended to relinquish a right, the fact finder should 
"assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is clearly 
intended." Soter'slnc. v. DeseretFed. Sap. <&LoanAss% 857 P.2d 935, 941 (Utah 1993). 
However, intent to relinquish must be distinct and "will not be implied from doubtful acts." 
Jensen v IRC Hospitals Inc., 2003 UT 51, \ 84, 82 P.3d 1076. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "any waiver must be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied." Soter's 
Inc. v. DeseretFed. Sav. &LoanAss% 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993) (internal citations 
omitted). By requiring a distinct manifestation of intent the Utah Supreme Court "ensure[d] 
that waiver would not be found from any particular set of facts unless it was clearly 
intended." Soterslnc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. &LoanAss'n, 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). 
Marshalled Evidence 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, "[a]n appellant 
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight 
of the evidence." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). See also West Valley City v. Majesticlnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) ("[I]he challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists."). As already noted, the first two elements of waiver (the existence of a 
right and the knowledge of its existence) are not at issue. However, the third element of 
waiver, "intent to relinquish the right" is fact-sensitive and requires the challenging party to 
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marshal all evidence from the record in support of the trial court's finding of such "intent." 
It is somewhat problematic that in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
trial court does not specifically analyze and apply the three elements of waiver to the facts. 
The trial court only generally identifies underlying facts on which it found a waiver of the 
Bradley's rights to reply on the September 13 deadline, namely: (1) the Markhams, through 
Ms. Norton, set up a September 12 meeting with Mr. Bradley to discuss their financial 
information, (2) Mr. Bradley was aware of the meeting and its purpose and had lead the 
Markhams and Norton to believe that he was the only contact person for the sellers, (3) Mr. 
Bradley did meet briefly with the Markhams and Ms. Norton on September 12, but when 
Mr. Markham tried to present the financial paperwork, Mr. Bradley refused to take the 
documents and asked if the documents could be reviewed at a later time, and (4) despite 
being the listing agent, for Property, Mrs. Bradley had never made herself available to discuss 
anything about the REPC prior the deadline. [K 285] 
The trial court never explains how these facts are tantamount to a "relinquishment" 
of their right to strict enforce the September 13 deadline for production of the Gredit Report 
(which was the only document required by the September 13 deadline—a document the 
Markhams admit they did not have on September 12). Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, 
the Bradleys have marshaled the evidence for each of the four enumerated facts cited by the 
trial court in support of its finding of waiver. 
(1) the Markhams, through their agent, set up a September 12 meeting with Mr. Bradley to discuss 
their financial information; 
• Mr. Markham testified that Ms. Norton set the meeting for September 12, in 
order to meet certain deadlines. [TT 28:22 through 29:1]. 
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• Ms. Norton testified that she arranged for the September 12 meeting to 
present financial information. [TT 137:3-16; 139:4-25; 142:2-9; TT 189:20]. 
• Mr. Bradley testified that a meeting was set up for September 12. [TT 281:11]. 
Mr. Bradley was aware of the meeting and its purpose and had lead the Markhams and Norton to 
believe that he was the only contact person for the sellers; 
• See preceding cites. 
• Ms. Norton testified that Mr. Bradley was the contact person for sellers and 
that Mr. Bradley notified Ms. Norton that Mrs. Bradley was out of the state 
and that he would be handling the transfer of relevant documents. [TT 116:12 
through 119:10; 144:15-24; TT 185:14]. 
• Mr. Bradley testified that he was the contact person for sellers and that Mrs. 
Bradley was out of the state and that he would be handling the transfer of 
relevant documents. [TT 281:13-18]. 
Mr. Bradley did meet briefly with the Markhams and Ms. Norton on September 12, but when Mr. 
Markham tried to present the financial paperwork, Mr Bradley refused to take the documents and 
asked if the documents could be reviewed at a later time; 
• Mr. Markham testified that the meeting was held on September 12 and that 
Mr. Bradley refused to take the documents and asked to review the documents 
later. [TT 35:16 through 40:25]. 
• Ms. Norton testified that the meeting was held on September 12 and that Mr. 
Bradley refused to take the documents and asked to review the documents 
later. [TT 148:22 through 152:7; 192:10 through 193:4; 196:17-19]. 
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• Mr. Bradley testified that the meeting was held on September 12 and that he 
refused to take the documents and asked to review the documents later. [TT 
282:12 through 285:7]. 
(4) despite being the listing agent, for Property, Mrs. Bradlej had never made herself available to discuss 
anything about the REPCprior to the deadline. 
• Mrs. Bradley testified that she was in Washington prior to the September 13 
deadline and that Mr. Bradley was directly handling the transaction, although 
communicating with her. [TV 332:14 through 335:12; 336:3 through 337:11; 
339:12 through 340:17]. 
• Ms. Norton testified that prior to the September 13 deadline, she was unable 
to contact Mrs. Bradley and worked directly with Mr. Bradley pursuant to his 
instructions. [TT 115:15 through 119:10; 123:5-19; 144:15 through 145:22]. 
• Mr. Bradley testified that he was the contact person for sellers and that Mrs. 
Bradley was out of the state and that he would be handling the transfer of 
relevant documents. [TT 281:13-18]. 
Additionally, the trial court noted that because Mr. Bradley was angry and because he 
wanted additional time to review the documents, it was "appropriate and reasonable for the 
Markhams not to provide any financial information, including a credit report, until such time 
as the new meeting was set." \R. 286]. According to the trial court, it would have been 
"futile" for the Markhams or Ms. Norton to try and present their financial information on 
Monday, September 13. The trial court also noted that "the Bradleys had accepted the 
REPC and [SFA] without a Buyer Financial Information Sheet, thereby waiving the right to 
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receive financial information in that particular form." [R. 286] 
(5) Mr. Bradley was angry and wanted additional time to review the documents; 
• Ms. Norton testified that Mr. Bradley was initially upset when they arrived on 
September 12. [R 148:10 through 149:12]. 
• Mr. Bradley testified that he was agitated when the Markhams and Ms. Norton 
arrived on September 12. [R 283:3; 284:9; 285:1] 
• Mr. Markham testified that Mr. Bradley was initially upset when they arrived 
on September 12. [R 36:12 through 37:16; 78:18-24]. 
• Ms. Norton testified that Mr. Bradley asked to review the documents at a later 
time. [R 150:19-21; 152:6-16]. 
(6) the Bradleys had accepted the REPC and SFA without a Buyer Financial Information Sheets 
• Ms. Norton testified that Mr. Bradley accepted the REPC and SFA without a 
Buyer Financial Information Sheet. [R 134:11 through 135:21]. 
Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear that Mr. Bradley did not waive 
his right to enforce the September 13 deadline when he requested the parties meet at a later 
date. The Bradleys do not dispute that they knew they had a right to enforce the September 
13 deadline for the Credit Report. [See Addendum "1"]. The Bradleys both signed the REPC 
and knew its contents. However, the trial court incorrectly found that they had intentionally 
waived their right to strictly enforce the deadline. [K285]. Undisputed facts establish that 
both parties performed on the contract as if there was not waiver. 
The Bradleys did not believe the Mr. Bradley's actions waived their right to rely on 
the September 13 deadline. After the September 12 meeting, the Bradleys were acting under 
42 
the assumption that the deadline was still in effect because they faxed the Section 7 Sellers 
Disclosures to the Markhams on September 13. [See Addendum "14"]. If the Bradleys had 
waived the deadline, it is unlikely that they would have been concerned about delivering the 
required disclosures to the Markhams by the September 13 deadline. 
The trial court also ignored the statute of frauds [see Utah Code Ann. 25-5-1 etseq. 
(1953)] and the fact that Section 14 of the REPC specifically prohibits oral modification of 
its terms in finding that Mr. Bradley orally waived the timely presentation of the Buyer 
Financial Information Sheet (which should have been submitted concurrently with the SFA). 
Furthermore, Ms. Norton did not understand Mr. Bradley's actions to waive his right 
to rely on the September 13 deadline. At trial she insisted that she would have returned to 
the house to leave the financials with Mr. Bradley if she would have known the deadline was 
September 13. However, Ms. Norton's assistant mistakenly informed her that the deadline 
for the credit report was September 30. The Markhams failed to deliver the required Credit 
Report not because of Mr. Bradley's actions, but because of Ms. Norton's own mistake. 
Mr. Bradley performed his part of the contract by sending out the Seller Disclosure 
Documents on September 13. Ms. Norton testified that she would have left the financial 
disclosure information with the Mr. Bradley if her assistant had not made the error. As a 
matter of law there could be no distinct, intentional waiver when uncontested evidence 
shows that neither party behaved in a manner consistent with waiver. 
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IV. The Bradleys are not estopped from strictly enforcing the Seller Disclosure 
Deadline as a result of Mr. Bradley's actions because there was no reasonable 
reliance by the Markhams. 
The trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the Bradleys were estopped 
from strictly enforcing the September 13 deadline. 
Estoppel is a highly fact-specific question that an appellate court reviews under an 
abuse of discretion standard. State, Dept. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Iri^arry, 893 P.2d 
1107,1108-09. (Utah 1995). 
There are three elements to a claim for Estoppel: 
"(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with 
a later-asserted claim; (2) the other party's reasonable action or inaction based 
upon the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injuiy 
to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate its statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Brixen v. 
Elton, 777 P.2d 1039,1043-44 (Ut. App. 1989). 
To meet the first element of an equitable estoppel claim, the party seeking to 
establish estoppel must to show that the other party "made a statement or admission, or that 
it acted in a manner inconsistent with its right to enforce the forfeiture provision of the 
parties' written lease agreement/5 IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D <& K Management, Inc., 2003 UT 
5 Tfll, 73 P.3d 320. The second element of estoppel is reasonable reliance. When relying on 
the statement of a party "it is not enough that the person who heard [the representations] 
deemed that he was warranted in acting as he did; the language used ought of itself to 
furnish the warrant." Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 
159, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955) (internal citations omitted). The third element of estoppel is 
whether the relying party would be harmed if the first party retracted its statement or act. 
I^arry, 893 P.2d at 1108-09. 
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Marshaled Evidence 
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, "|a]n appellant 
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight 
of the evidence." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). See also West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) ("[Tjhe challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists."). Although there is not a strict marshalling requirement in appealing a 
finding of estoppel, the Bradleys have marshaled the evidence in challenging the finding of 
estoppel because estoppel is "highly fact specific" question. 
As with its analysis of the "waiver" doctrine, the trial court does not analyze and apply 
the three elements of estoppel in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. If anything, 
the trial court says even less about estoppel, only briefly noting that "[d]ue to Mr. Bradley's 
refusal to talk about the issue and Mrs. Bradley's refusal to make herself available, the 
Bradleys are estopped to rely on the September 13 deadline...." [R.285]. This brief mention 
of estoppel is apparently conflated with the more broad discussion of waiver. Accordingly, 
the Bradleys respectfully direct this Court to the marshaled evidence presented in the 
preceding Argument section of this brief relating to "waiver." 
The trial court's estoppel analysis is incorrect for two reasons. First under the plain 
language of the contract, the Markhams failed to present their financial information at the 
time they executed the SFA Second, Mr. Bradley's statement was not inconsistent with his 
later actions and even if it was, undisputed testimony establishes that neither the Markhams 
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nor their agent, Ms. Norton, relied on Mr. Bradley's statements. They explicitly stated that 
they failed to meet the September 13 deadline because they were relying on Ms. Norton's 
mistaken belief that the deadline was September 30. 
The trial court held that "the Bradleys are estopped to rely on the September 13 
deadline; it would be inequitable to allow the Bradleys to take advantage of their own 
obstructive and misleading conduct." [R.285]. The Bradleys should not have been estopped 
from holding the Markhams to the Seller Disclosure Deadline because Mr. Bradley's 
statements and behavior on the September 12 meeting were not inconsistent with his later 
behavior and Ms. Norton was not relying on his actions when she failed to produce the 
financial documents. 
The elements of estoppel are clearly defined but the trial court did not apply any test 
let alone analyze the appropriate elements or correctly apply the three factor test. The trial 
court relied on a misconception that the Bradleys made themselves totally unavailable which, 
in turn, made it impossible for the Markhams to comply with the deadline. [K 285]. Mr. 
Bradley's statement that he did not want to review the financial information on the 
September 12 did not relate to or refer to the deadline on September 13 because he still 
faxed to Ms. Norton his Seller Disclosure Documents as required by the REPC. [See 
Addendum "14"]. 
Even if, under the first element, Mr. Bradley's conduct on September 12 was 
inconsistent with his later acts, the trial court erred because the Markhams and Ms. Norton 
undisputedly did not rely on his behavior. Ms. Norton admits in her testimony that she 
called her assistant who told her that the Seller Disclosure Deadline was not until September 
30. Ms. Norton further testified that if she would have known the deadline was on 
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September 13, she would have returned to the house and left the financial documents with 
Mr. Bradley on the 12th. [TT 197:4 through 198:25]. Neither Ms. Norton nor the Markhams 
relied on his conduct. They relied on their own mistaken information. [Id.; TT 64:3-8 
(Douglas Markham testifying that he understood that the 13th was the deadline for the 
financial disclosures)]. 
The Markhams would not be harmed by allowing Mr. Bradley to repudiate his 
statement or act because there is no inconsistency with his later actions. However, if Mr. 
Bradleys' actions were inconsistent and the Markhams relied on such inconsistency (which 
they did not), the Markhams only injury would be two trips to St. George. They would still 
have had the opportunity to find new property as it had only been twenty-three days (August 
28 to September 20) since they first saw the Bradleys5 property. [R. 269; 278 ]. The Bradleys 
should not be estopped from enforcing the Seller Disclosure Deadline as the facts do not 
show a statement in conflict with later actions, no reliance on the Bradleys' allegedly 
inconsistent conduct, and no injury to the Markhams as a result of Mr. Bradleys' actions. 
V. The trial court erred in ordering specific performance on the sale of the 
property. 
Specific performance is a remedy for breach of a legal or contractual obligation. 
Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed.1999). To warrant specific performance "the aggrieved 
party must make an unconditional tender of the performance required by the agreement" 
Collard v. Nagle, 2002 UT App 306, \ 19, 57 P.3d 603 (emphasis added) (quoting Kelley v. 
LeucadiaFin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992)). To tender performance, the "Buyer 
must have fully tendered, or stood ready to fully tender, her own performance under the 
contract." Id. 
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The ability to immediately fulfill one's responsibility under the contract is requisite for 
claiming specific performance. Kelley v. Leucadia Yin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1992). 
When a contract is clear as to the terms, parole evidence is not allowed, and the terms must 
be followed strictly. Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, f), 977 P.2d 550. 
The Bradleys should not have been required to sell their home to the Markhams 
under the doctrine of specific performance. In order for the Markhams to satisfy the specific 
performance tender requirement, on September 12th the Markhams should have stood ready 
to perform. The Markhams did not present several required documents in order to fully 
perform. 
The SFA specifically required the Buyer Financial Information Sheet to be submitted 
concurrent with the SFA. Ms. Norton testified that the Markhams did not provide her with 
the required information. The SFA also required the Markhams to submit a current credit 
report by the Seller Disclosure Deadline, which was September 13. The Markhams admitted 
at trial that they did not have a credit report with them when they met with Mr. Bradley on 
September 13 and they did not fax or send a credit report to the Bradleys by the September 
13 deadline. The trial court found that Mr. Markham had sufficient financial information 
because he had "a prior financial statement" from 2003 and a "sample form . . . if the 
Bradleys decided to adopt such a form/' [R. 277]. Mr. Markham testifies that he had to 
whiteout and rewrite over the financial form before faxing it to Ms. Norton. [K 280]. On 
September 12th the Markhams did not have a copy of their Credit Report as required by 
Section 8 of the SFA 
Even if the trial court was correct in finding that the Markhams were ready to 
perform on September 12, their performance was not complete and they could not provide 
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the Credit Report. The Markhams lacked the Credit Report as required by the Section 8 of 
the SFA. [See Addendum "1"]. 
Because the Markhams failed to provide the required Buyer Financial Information 
Sheet concurrent with the SFA and because they failed to provide the Bradleys with a credit 
report as required by section 8.1 of the SFA, it is clear that the Markhams had not fully 
performed under the contract and were not entitled to the remedy of specific performance. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's decision below and enter judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of the Bradleys. 
Respectfully submitted this U day of June, 2007. 
JUSTINB^LSWICK, 
s&sciONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C., 
Attorneys for Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 1 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This hi a fegaify binding' contract Utah taw raquirec rta! t t tale licensees to use this form. Buyer and Seller, however, may agree to after or deieto 
Ha provisions or to use a different form. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advfsor. 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buyer Doug and Prea MarKham „ , -
 r°P?$J% Pachas* »te Property 
descnbed below and hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the amount of $1 .pOO.OO in the form of 
personal check which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23), 
shall be deposited in accordance with state law. 
Received by: on (Date) 
(Signature of agent/broker acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money) 
Brokerage: Century 21 At The Rockies/SLGeorge Phone Number 435-673-9090 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY:979 Dammeron Valley Drive 
also described as: Pinion Hills subdivision 
City of St. George , County of Washington Stale of Utah, Zip 84783 (the "Property"). 
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned and attached to 
the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; 
light fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and 
windows; window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; 
automatic garage door opener and accompanying transmitters); fendng; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall 
also be Included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: 
1.2 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sale: 
1.3 Water Rights. The following water rights are included in this sale: three shares wfth property and 
anv other currently used on property 
SL PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is $550,000.00 
2.1 Method of Payment The Purchase Price will be paid as follows: 
$ 1 ,000 .00 (a) Earnest Money Deposit Under certain conditions described In this Contract THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$ (b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2.3. Buyer will apply 
for one or more of the following loans: [ I CONVENTIONAL [ IFHA [ J VA 
[ ] OTHER (specify) 
If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum. 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details: 
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS 
$ (c) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable) 
$ 285 ,000 ,00 (d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
$ (e) Other (specify). 
$ 265 ,000 .00 (f) Balance of Purchase Price In Cash at Settlement 
$ 550 ,000 .00 PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f) 
2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) [ A ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable 
loan(s) referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition." 
(b) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan-
Section 2.3 does not apply. 
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2.3 Application for Loan. 
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shall 
apply for the Loan. 'Loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has: (I) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the 
"Lender) the Initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender; and (11) paid all loan application fees as 
required by the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any 
additional documentation as required by the Lender. 
(b) Procedure If Loan Application Is denied. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender 
does not approve the Loan (a 'Notice of Loan Denial"), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a 
copy to Seller. Buyer or Seller may, within three calendar days after Seller's receipt of such notice, cancel this Contract by 
providing written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.3(b): (i) if the Notice of Loan 
Denial was received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the Earnest Money 
Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (11) If the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money 
Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy the Earnest Money Deposit as 
liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided In this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing Condition set 
forth In Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by 
such other provisions. 
2.4 Appraisal Condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [)fl IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property 
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price. This condition is referred to as the 'Appraisal Condition". If the Appraisal 
Condition applies and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property has appraised for less than the 
Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by provicfing a copy of such written notice to 
Seller no later than three days after Buyer's receipt of such written notice. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 
2.4: (I) If the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline referenced In Section 
24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (li) If the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer 
after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive 
remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided In this Section 2.4 shall be 
deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer. Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this 
Contract shall be governed by such other provisions. 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. 
Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced In Section 24(0, or on a date upon which Byyor and 
Seller agree In writing. *Settlemenr shall occur only when all of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Seller 
have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by the 
Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these 
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office 
in the form of collected or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have 
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer 
shall each pay one-half (Vfc) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing process. 
Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and Interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as 
set forth In this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limited to, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid 
rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement Prorations set forth In this Section shall be made as of the 
Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such writing 
could include the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement has been completed, 
and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by the Lender to 
Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the office of the 
county recorder. The actions described in parts 0) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within four calendar 
days of Settlement. 
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: [ J hours [ ] days after Closing; 
M Other (specify) funding and recording 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract: 
[ ] Seller's Initials [ J Buyer's Initials 
The Listing Agent, Darby Bradley , represents pQ Seller [ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
The Listing Broker, Red Desert Realty , represents [XJ Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
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The Selling Agent. Carolyn Norton/Stewart Shumway , represents I ] Seller [X] Buyer I ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
The Selling Broker. Century 21 / Russ Gwiiliam , represents [ ] Seller [XJ Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
6, TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance 
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b). Seller shall 
provide to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures": 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller; 
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance; 
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or 
zoning code violations; and 
(e) Other (specify) . 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
under this Contract (chock applicable boxes): 
(a) [X I IS [ J IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in 
Section 7; 
(b) [XI IS [ J IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
(c) [XI IS [ 1 IS NOTconcfitioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey"); 
(d) I 1 IS [XI IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost terms and availability of homeowner's insurance 
coverage for the Property; 
(e) [ J IS [XI IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify) 
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1,8.2,8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not 
apply. The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the •Evaluations & Inspections." Unless 
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by 
incfividuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walk-
through inspection under Section 11. 
8,1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in 
Section 24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & Inspections 
are acceptable to Buyer. 
& 2 Right to Cancel or Object If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may, 
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by provkSng written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections. 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel 
this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, 
the Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer. 
&4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of 
resolving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing- upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under 
this Section 8.4, Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warranted 
in Section 10. 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there 
are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: [ X 1 Addendum 
No.J 
[XI Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ 1 Lead-Based Paint 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure is required by law) [ ] Lead-Based Paint 
Addendum (in some transactions this addendum Is required by law) [ ] Other (specify): 
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and 
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property 
subject to the following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and 
restrictions), and rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer 
under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Properly and not expiring 
prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other 
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 
2.1(c). Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and 
warrants. Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-related 
damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense; 
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will 
be in working order and fit for their intended purposes; 
(c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller; 
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order 
and fit for its intended purpose; and 
(o) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be in the same general condition as they were on 
the date of Acceptance. 
10.3 Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced in this Section 10.3 is separate from the 
warranties provided by Seller under Sections 10.1 and 10.2 above. (Check applicable boxes): A one-year Home 
Warranty Plan [XI WILL [ ] WILL NOT be included in this transaction. If included, the Home Warranty Plan shall be 
ordered by [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller and shall be issued by a company selected by [X I Buyer [ ] Seller. The cost of the 
Home Warranty Plan shall not exceed $350 and shall be paid for at Settlement by [ j Buyer [XI Seller. 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, 
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented," meaning that 
the items referenced In Sections 1.1,8.4 and 10.2 (The items") are respectively present repaired/changed as agreed, and 
in the warranted condition. If the Items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement replace, correct or repair the 
items or, with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same. 
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a 
waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the Items as represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none 
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made; 
(b) no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or 
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes. and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
(check applicable box) 
[ ]SHALL 
[X] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a 
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If 
mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 
shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to 
return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults, in 
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
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available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
demand. It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section 
2.3(b). 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation 
in mediation under Section 15. 
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) 
signed by the party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable 
date referenced in this Contract. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be 
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be 
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each Section 
of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and (b) 
the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the 
timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance, Notice of Loan Denial, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall 
not be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed 
to in writing by such non-party. 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) 
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to Indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other 
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline September 6,2004 (Date) 
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline September 13, 2004 (Date) 
(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline October 4. 2004 (Date) 
(d) Loan Denial Deadline September 30. 2004 (Date) 
(e) Appraisal Deadline September 30. 2004 (Date) 
(f) Settlement Deadline October 29, 2004 (Date) 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If 
Seller does not accept this offer by: 5:00 [ ] AM [X] PM Mountain Time on September'*'2004 (Date), 
•shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer 
V \ ^ l 
ittfre) (Offer Date) (Buyer's Signature) (Offer Date) 
The later of the above Offer Dates shall be referred to w the "Offer Reference Date" 
Doug and Prea Markham 
(Buyers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
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ACCEPT ANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified 
above. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or 
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO. . 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Sellers'Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
[ J REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (Rll in applicable 
section below.) 
fledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing (Jtoptfacrtbearing ^ li signatures: 
(Buyer's Signature) (Date) \y (Buyer's SiQqfatufe) v (Date) 
Doug Markham Drea Me 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Seller's Signature) (Date) 
B. I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ 1 faxed [ ] mailed [ ] hand 
delivered on (Date), postage prepaid, to the [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer. 
Sent/Delivered by (specify) 
THS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ANO THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5,2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THS FORM. 
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SELLER RNANCING ADDENDUM 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS SELLER RNANCING ADDENDUM is made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Date of August 3 1 . 2004 , between Doug and Drea Markham 
as Buyer, and Jay and Darhy Rmritey as Seller, regarding 
the Property located at 979 Dammeron Valley Drive . The terms of this ADDENDUM are 
hereby incorporated as part of the REPC. 
1. CREDIT DOCUMENTS. Seller's extension of credit to Buyer shall be evidenced by: [x] Note and Deed of Trust 
[ ] Note and All-Inclusive Deed of Trust [ I Other: 
2. CREDIT TERMS. The terms of the credit documents referred to in Section 1 above are as follows: 
$285000 principal amount of the note (the "Note"); interest at 5.5 % per annum; payable at approximately 
$ 939ft fi9 per month . The entire unpaid balance of principal plus accrued interest is due inlflQ months 
from date of the Note. First payment due December 1. f04 . Additional principal payments, balloon payments or other 
terms as follows: $100,000 due on December 1 , 2005r after balloon payment, monthly payment will be 
reduced to $1,511,60 
The credit documents referenced in Section 1 of this ADDENDUM will contain a due<xi-sale clause in favor of Seller. Seller 
agrees to provide to Buyer at Settlement: (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written disclosure 
of the total interest Buyer will pay to maturity of the Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on loan 
closing costs. 
3- TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. In addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above, Buyer shall also be 
responsible for (a) property taxes; (b) homeowners association dues; (c) special assessments; and (d) hazard insurance 
premiums on the Property. These obligations will be paid: [ I directly to Seller/Escrow Agent on a monthly basis [x 
1 directly to the applicable county treasurer, association, and insurance company as required by those entities. 
4. PAYMENT. Buyer's payments under Sections 2 and 3 above wiD be made to: [X] Seller [ ] an Escrow Agent If an 
Escrow Agent, will act as Escrow Agent and will be responsible for disbursing payments 
on any underlying mortgage or deed of trust (the "underlying mortgage") and to the Seller. Cost of setting up the escrow 
account shall be paid by: [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller [ I split evenly between the parties. 
5. LATE PAYMENT/PREPAYMENT. Any payment not made within 15 days after it is die is subject to a late charge 
of $25 or % of the installment due, whichever is greater. Amounts in default shall bear interest at a rate 
of 5 J 5 _ _ % per annum. All or part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity wfthout penalty. 
6. DUE-ON-SALE As part of the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7 of the REPC, Seller shall provide to Buyer a 
copy of the underlying mortgage, the note secured thereby, and the amortization schedule. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
under this Contract is conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of those documents, in accordance with Section 8 
of .the REPC. If the holder of the underlying mortgage calls the loan due as a result of this transaction, Buyer agrees to 
discharge the underlying loan as required by the mortgage lender. In such event, Seller's remaining equity shall be paid as 
provided in the credit documents. 
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a required part of this ADDENDUM, the attached Buyer 
Financial Information Sheet. Buyer may use the Buyer Financial Information Sheet approved by the Real Estate Commission 
and the Attorney General's Office, or may provide comparable written information in a different format, together with such 
additional information as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer [ J WILL [x] WILL NOT provide Seller with copies of IRS 
returns forthe two preceding tax years. Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contact Buyer's current employer for verification 
of employment as represented by Buyer in the Buyer Financial Information Sheet. 
8. SELLER APPROVAL By the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) of the REPC, Buyer shall provide 
to Seller, at Buyer's expense, a current credit report on Buyer from a consumer credit reporting agency. Seller may use the 
credit report and the information referenced in Section 7 of this Addendum ("Buyer Disclosures") to evaluate the credit-
worthiness of Buyer. 
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8.1 Seller Review. By the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC, Seller shall 
review the credit report and the Buyer Disclosures to determine if the content of the credit report and the Buyer Disclosures, 
is acceptable. If the content of the credit report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller, Seller may elect to 
either: (a) provide written objections to Buyer as provided in Section 8.2 of this ADDENDUM; or (b) immediately cancel the 
REPC by providing written notice to Buyer by the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the 
REPC. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest 
Money Deposit. 
8.2 Seller Objections. If Seller does not immediately cancel the REPC as provided above, Seller may, by the 
Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC, provide Buyer with written objections. Buyer 
and Sefler shall have seven calendar days after Buyer's receipt of the objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree 
in writing upon the manner of resolving Seller's objections. Buyer may, but shall not be required to, resolve Seller's 
objections. If Seller and Buyer have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Seller's objections, Seller may cancel 
the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response Period. 
The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money 
Deposit. 
8.3 Failure to Object. If Seller does not deliver a written objection to Buyer regarding the credit report or a Buyer 
Disclosure by the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC or cancel the REPC as 
provided in Sections 8.1 or 8.2 of this ADDENDUM, the credit report and Buyer Disclosures will be deemed approved by 
Seller. 
9. TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer [ I SHALL [ J SHALL NOT provide to Seller a lender's policy of title insurance in the 
amount of the Indebtedness to the Setter, and shall pay for such policy at Settlement 
10. DISCLOSURE OF TAX ©ENTIHCATION NUMBERS. By no later than Settlement Buyer and Seller shall disclose 
to each other their respective Sociaf Security Numbers or other applicable tax identification numbers so that they may compfy 
with federal laws on reporting mortgage interest in filings with the Internal Revenue Service. 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. AH other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not 
modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [XJ Seller [ 1 Buyer shall have until 5 f l 0 f ]AM[XJPM 
Mountain Time on September 1. 2004 (Date), to accept the terms of this SEll.FR FINANCING ADDENDUM in 
accordance with Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING 
ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
[ ] Buyer [ J Seller Signature (Date) (Time) Social Security Number 
[ J Buyer [ ] Seller Signature (Date) (Time) Social Security Number 
ACCEPTANCOCOUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ J Buyer hereby accepts these terms. 
t J COUNTEROFFER:! ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents £s a counteroffer the terms set forth on the attached ADDENDUM 
NO. 
T~JI/\/l -—^- <\^H 
(Signature) —-""^ (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ 1 REJECTION:! ] Seller [ 1 Buyer rejects the foregoing SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17, 199& FT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSK>NS OF THIS FORM, 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS IS AN [X] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Date of August 3 1 , 2004 , including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
Doug and Drea Markham as Buyer, and Jay and Darby Bradley as Seller, 
regarding the Property located at979 Dammeron valley Drive . The 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: 
1) S e l l e r agrees to complete construction of home. 
2) Buyer and Se l l er to l i s t expectations of completion upon next t r ip to St . George 
in mid September. 
3) Furniture to be included, ( s e l l e r to attach l i s t of included items) 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADUNES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [Xj REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: 
/ T o the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, inducing all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
1 by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ X I Seller ( J Buyer shall have until 5:00 [ ] AM [X] PM 
Mountainllmcrorr^ggnacfe 31 r 2004 (Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
^< j Buyer [ ] Seller^ignature (Date) (Time) [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature (Date) (Time) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
[ J ACCEPTANCE: [ J Seller [ J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ I Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ J REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ J Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THtS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
TOSBANt l^DWDUM W C O W m a W f ^ 
miOmrMiw*\aoQ**<*S*D*:*i*>*x 3, 30q4 , indurfnn art prior atttmai and oounJTnrfUrr, H - , T H 
Pong JUKI Dic#a tokn** « Bu*r •ndj iv «od D«1>y Brmllgv « ^ ^ 
iyc<ngtNi Propertybc<^gd>7^M^ ffgOTOti ffT ^ ^ Th# 
•r* hereby tocflrpofaiw « part GHh* 
X) Down pnyntct tft b+ Ingremf^l t o »3aS,0PO, 
— ' W ^ ^ — — — • < •<»•• • — — — — — 1 i '•• . i u n a . — — — m m — m » — m m * + * m * 
2) JMtTUcwrc t o be nagotlacgfl toy buyer *ntf *«Il*r« 
^Jgfttovfffr mr>ttrij fn fig Z^titefttefo -trvNftmfr' 
<»UVEl l#WtQJJQRJlClKlHCT^ 
(CHEOKItyfnJCABtJE ttOaQ: 11 W aWM lJMTlJ4)Mirjf i r ~ ~ " " 
Toto«arrttw*mwoffifcADOeKXM 
and countarofa^ t i ro terra t^^ 
l2loilhaRe«X U t f « a f * ^ 
COUKxamMI l_M: f fSaaatfl ]atoy**prafantoaaa/«M**M*)M^tfMt»iimfrf 1 
V ^ O H 
(sSSGni) 3 (Dil) (TIT*) 
1 HEJBCTIOH: [ ] » a * a r ( Jfkiyaricjoott th4 foni^XJ W O e O U R 
{SlofwfaJcv} (Date) (Tim*) (Sift*****) (Oata) OrtmoJ 
£ * £- If 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
[ and Dtea Martcham offers to purchase lte Property 
I hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the amount of SI ,000.00 in the lorm of 
r-. - - - rr- .. - which, upon Acceptance o( this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23). 
shall be derxjsiterJTh accordance with state law. 
Received by: on (Date) 
Brokerage: Century 21 At The Rockie^StGeorne Phone Number 435-673-9090 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
i . PRQPEKTY:979 Daraneron VaBey Drive 
ateo described as: Pinion Hflte subdivision 
City of S t George .County of Washington .Slate of Uteri 25p 84783 rfiie^yropCTtvn-
1-1 Included Rem*, Ijnteas sxc&sded herein, thfe sale Inrfudes ihefdlowng rfems a presently owned and attached to 
#ie Property: pJufBdaing, teating,. air conrJtioring ibdures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; 
%$$ fixtures aid iaJbs; bathroom fixtiffes; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and 
windows; window Winds; awnings; installed television entertna; satellite cfehes and system; permanently affixed carpets; 
automatic garage door opener end accompanying inaisrnitlerfe); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall 
also be indMded in this sale aid conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: 
l-2E»!kKi8(f tew. The fciJowing tens are excluded tram this safe: 
1.3 Water Right*. The fafow^ w s ^ rio^ 
mwofow mrrertfrf used on property 
2, PURCHASE PRICE. The Purdttase Price for 1he Property is g 5 5 0 , ( m 0 0 
2.1 ttoftod of Payment The Purchase Price mil be paid as follows: 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 (*) Earnest Homy Daposft Under certain conditions described in ttUA Contract THIS 
0S*O3n"«iAY a H X M y E T O T J U J - Y i O W ^ ^ N D ^ L E . 
$ <b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply fcr a new loan as p r ^ Buyer will apply 
for one or more of the following loans: [ ] COWVEMTIONAL [ IFHA [ J VA 
MOTHER (specify) , 
If an FHA/VA loan applies* see attached ft^AA/A L o ^ Addendum. 
If the loan Is to include any particular terms* then cnacic below aid give details: 







2 ^ . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
550,000.00 
(0) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable) 
(d) Sonar Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
(ft) Other (specify;. 
(f) Baianc* of Purciiase Price In Cash at Settlement 
PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f) 
22 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) {A} Buyets obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable 
toan(s) referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (^ "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the 'Financing Condition.* 
(b) ( ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan. 
Section 2.3 does not apply. 
V 
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2 3 Application for Loan. 
(a) Buy*?* duties, No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadfine referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shall 
applyforlhe Leaa loan Appfcafioif occurs only when Buyer has: (?) competed, s&gned, and delivered to One lender (the 
"Lender) the inifiafl loan appicafion and documentation required by the lender; and (H) paid all loan application fees as 
maaafed by toe Lender- Bu^agn3eslod%jein%warktoGbt^ Buyerw$ prornptfy provfcte the Lenderwtthany 
adStional documentation as reaped by the Lender. 
<*>) Procodum If Loan Application is; den Jad. if Buysr receive w?9$an notice irom the Lender #iat the Lender 
(toes not approve the Loan (a "Nogoo of Loan Denial")* Buyer shall, no late- then three cale«idar d 2 ^ thef^^ft^, provide a 
copytoSetier, Buyer or Se&^ may, wfthin three catena 
prnvicir^ wriStoi rK^ce to t ie o»^f party. In the event of a canceSialfon under this Section 2-3<bj: 0) & the Notice of Loan 
DaniaJ was received by Buyer no later than the Loan DeniaJ Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the Earnest Money 
DeposftshsSberBtornedtoBu^r^tf 
Deposit shafl be released to Setter, and SeSer agrees to accept as Sailer's exclusive remedy the Earnest Mon ey Depoa ft as 
flqutdafced damages* A f a f c ^ t o c a n ^ m p r a w a a ^ m ^ S e c ^ 
forth Hi Section 2J2{&). CanceSaian pursuant lo tie provisions of any otter secfion of tils Contract shall be governed by 
such other provtefons. 
2 4 ApprdtatCoodBttofi. Buyers obigaison to purchase tie Property pfl IS I ] IS NOT concfitioned upon the Property 
appraising for not Jess than the Purtf^p? Price. This condWon is referred to as the "Appraisal Condffion*'. W the Appraisal 
ConcS&on appSes -a^ jd #*e Bus«r recedes written no#cefcom fhe Lender that foe Property has appraised for less than the 
Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by provicfing a copy of such written notice to 
Satfartio later f ^ t & a e days aQer Buyer's r e ^ ^ m fae ewent of a cancelation under this Section 
2.4: (i) if the NoBce erf Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than Ihe Appraisal Deadfine referenced in Secflon 
24(e\. lhe Earnest Money Deposit shall be resumed to Buyer; (H) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer 
afer that date* the Earnest fctoney Deposit sftal be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exefuswe 
remedy, lh& Earnest Money Deposit as Gqufdated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.4 shall be 
deemed a waiver of fl*e Appraisal Conefiiion by Buyer. Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this 
Contact shall be governed by such other provfsioris. 
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSiNa 
Stfttenient shall teks pte(?e on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f), or on a date upon which Buyer and 
Saftar agree in ws$ng- "Seffiemmtr shafi occur ortfy vhm all ot the fttoi^ to^ b e ^ cOTipfefed: (a) Buyer and Seller 
have dgned and delivered to each otiw or fo the escrowfciosing office aS documents required by this Contract, by the 
Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by app&cabte law; <b) any monies nsai&ed to be paid by Buyer under these 
dooflttenis (except to- the proceeds ef any new ban) have been dafotered by Buyer to Seller or to the escro^dosing office 
fn the tern of co&eded or cteared funds; and (cj ^tfy monies requited to be paid by Salter under these documents have 
Seen deferred by SeSer to B i ^ or ^ Seller and Buyer 
shaSeacb pay one-half {¥§ of the fee cfoargedby 1ha escrow/c&jstng office for tin services in the settiement/blosing process. 
Taxes and assessments fre ti» a ^ ^ 
set fortrj-ki this Section. Tenant deposit (incSurjinG, but not Bmrted to, security deports, cleaning deposits and prepaid 
nen^afoa&bepaldorcred^b^^ Prorations set forth ^ this Secttonshali be madeasofthe 
Secernent Deacfine date referenced in Sesfion 24(f). unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such writing 
coukiindkidB the senjement statement Ute transaction wii] be consUen^l closed when Settlement has been completed, 
and when «$ of the fotowSngtafla been computet (i) theproceeds of any new loan have been deHv r^ed by the Lender to 
SGSBC or to the escroratffefosing offt»; and (^ t © applfc^te Cfosing documents have been recorded rn the office of me 
county rwoider. Tte sK^onso^scrfeed In parte (i) and (1Q of tn^ 
days of Settlement 
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: [ ] hows £ J days attar Closing; 
DO Other ttoectfv) funding and recording „ . _ 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY OtaXOSURE, At the signing of this Contract: 
t ^ / J Setter* InWate [ ] Buy**** Initials 
The Ustino Anent. Darby BradteV
 x tepreserts £XJ Salter [ ] Buyer [ J both Buyer and Setter 
aft a Limited Aoeitt; 
The Lis^no Broker. Bed Desert Reattv
 f represents £XI Seite £ ] toyw[ I both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
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TheSeflami Agent. Carolyn Norton/Stewart Shumwav . represents f I Seller [X] Buyer j jboth Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
TMSe8fl^Bn^eir,Centigy21/ RussGvflffiam , repnasents £ J SeBer M Buyer {J both Buyer wd Seller 
« i a Limited Agent; 
6- TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, SeMer sgraes to pay tor a siaraian&ccverage owner's po&cy of ##e snsurartce 
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any add&ona* ^insurance coverage shall be af Buyer's axpense. 
7- SELLH1 DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b). Seller shall 
provkfe to Buyer tfie fatoMng documents vtiucti are co&ectrvely retired to as the "Setter Disclosures": 
(a) a Seller property corioWonifed^ 
fbl a commitment for ihe policy of title insurance; 
(C) a copy of any leases aiffec&t^  the Property i ^ 
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or 
zoning code violations; and 
(e) Other (specify) 
a BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCH- BASED ON EVAliJATlGNS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purdrxose 
ander this Contract (check applicable box**): 
(a) DQIS { ] & ^ T condoned upon BuyW^appr^^ 
Section 7; 
{*>) DQIS £ JISMOTcoiixli&onedupanBuye^ | q M S [ ]ISMOrrOTnc§fof^u|X)nBu^saffl 
(d) I J ® fXJSHOTcorjc&for^up^ 
coverage fa* tie Property: 
I*) I I ® 1X1 IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the f ollcwing tests and evatoaikjris of the Property; (specify) 
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmgfoe, then SecSons 8.1,8.2, &3 aid 8,4 apply; otherwise, they do not 
appfiy. The items o&ec&ti m the af§rmat*ve 3fr»e am cxritecMv^ Unless 
othermse provided in titis Contact, fie Evafej^kms & Inspector shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by 
w&vkktQlsor entities o$ Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate wth thfc Evaluations & inspections and with the walk-
Ifcough inspection under Section 11-
a.1 Evaluations h Inspections Dwdllna. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in 
Secfcn 2*(Q) fii^yer &aik (a) comp&ie al Evsfoafans & tospecSons; and (fa) d^smrire ff fl^ Evaluations & inspections 
am acceptable to Buyer. 
&2 raghttoGKoca!orObidCL If Buyer detemtenies thai the Evatuatf^ 
no later than the Bragua&ons & InspecSons DearJine, erfoer: (a) cancel fsis Contract by provjdng written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Mooey Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Setter with written notice of objections. 
8 3 Failure to Respond. If by the expkafen of the Evalua&ons & [inspections Deadline, Buyer does not; (a) cancel 
&n"s Contract as pttwded in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, 
the &ratua£on& £ fetspedfons shaft be deemed approved by Buyer-
s ' R«pon»e by Seite*. If Buyer provides written objections to SeBer, Buy©-wtd Seller shall have seven calendar 
d ^ s after Safins nsdegpt of Buyer's obpectiorBS {the -Response PmocT) In which to agree* in writing upon the manner of 
resolving Buyer's ob^ecttons. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
obfec&ms. If Buyer and SeMer have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections. Buyer may 
caned Ms Contract by pravking written notice to Setter no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under 
this Section 8.4, Buyer's abjections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warranted 
in Section 10, 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There DQ ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there 
are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: I X ] Addendum 
No.j 
] ^ S a ^ B n » w * i g A i ^ t o « l u m [ IFHA/VA Loan Addendum I ] Assumption Addondurn [ ] Laad-Bwed Paint 
Dtectottmi & Ackmwkrigemem ^ I ] Lead-Based Paint 
Add©fxtum(ki«nwtnjn*j**k^ [ ] Other (spoeffy): 
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES X Re^^SafTAHQNa 
10.1 Condition of TiflgL Setter represents ttoai SeHer has fee titte K» the Poverty and witt convoy good and 
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by genenafl warranty deed Buyer agrees, however, to accept titte to the Property 
subgect to the fctftowing matters of record: easements, cteed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and 
restrictions), and rights-of-way; ^ KJ subject to the contents of the Commitment for Tito Insurance as agreed to by Buyer 
under Section & Buyer ateo agnses to Jake the psoperty subject to existing teases affecting the Property &vi not expiring 
prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible tor taxes, assessments, homecwmers association dtjes, utilities, and oilier 
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except tor any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 
2L1{C), Se8er wii3 cause to be p&d off by dosing aft mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and 
warrants. Seller wMicmise to be paid current by Gtoswi^  
14X2 Condition of Property. Sailer warrants that the Property will be m the fofJowmg concfition ON THE DATE 
SELLER PEUVeW PffYSIGftt, POSSESSION TO BUYEH: 
(a) fiie Property ahuall be broom-dean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-related 
damage to the Property sha! be repaired at Setters expense; 
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing, and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will 
b8 tei woridng order and fit for t to r attended purposes; 
(c) the roof aid foundation shall be free of leeks known to Seller; 
.(**} any private weSI or septie tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, erci shall be in working order 
and fit to* its intended purpose; and 
(e) the Property and improvements, inducfit^} the landscaping, wilt be in the same general condition as tUey were on 
the dale of Acceptance. 
1&3 Home Warranty Ptei. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced \n this Section 10.3 is separate from the 
warranties provided by SeHer urxler Sections 10.1 and 1(L2 above. (Check applicable bora*); A one-year Home 
Wamfflfly Plan [XI WILL { J WILL NOT be included in this transaction. If inducted, the Home Warranty Plan shall be 
ordered by { 1 Buy*r £ ] Sailer a id steS! be issued by aoompany Selected by [X I Buyer I J Sailer. Tire cost of the 
Home W a n ^ Plan sha!2 not e x c e c r i } ^ j Buyer [XJ Salter. 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, 
conduct a "wafk^iiough" SnepesSon of the Property to determine only tisi the Properly is *as represented," meaning that 
fhB ftems referenced in Secfens 1A. 8,4 md 10.2 (The items") are respectively present repafredfchanged as agreed, and 
intoisairantedcaracftioa. if l i t e m s are not as repses^ 
items or, mfa the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same. 
The Jaikwe to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a 
waiver by Buyer of the right io receive, on the date of possessicHri, the items as represented, 
12. CHANGE pyf i t IG TRANSACTION- Seller ^ B e s that from the date erf Acraptance unfii the da^ of Closing, none 
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made; 
(b) no new leases shafl be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be mate or 
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SJGNEftSL If Buyer or Seiter is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on Its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller 
14* CGSPUEIE CONTHACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
reoreseniations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DEPUTE fl^OLUTJON. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
(check Applicable box) 
MSHALL 
tXj MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
ikst be submitted to mecfettion. if the parties agree to mediation, the dispute sh^t be submitted to mediation through a 
meciafejn provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mecfiafion. If 
mediation fails, the other procedures end remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 
sh^H prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. 
16. OBFAULT, If Buyer defeats, Seller rnssf eteetei&er to retain the Earned Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to 
reiumttandsueBuy^tospiectf^ If Seller defaults, in 
addffion to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages* or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
Pago 4 o f« pages Seflerti Initiate\ A; Date i; * : 7 Buyer's fnitiala <)•/*» Date 1 ^ ~ ° t 
Q 0<r 
avatable aa law. If Buyer elects to accept lkyidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
demand. H is agmed that denial of a Loan Appfccafton made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section 
£3(b). 
17.ATTO8ieYFGSSANDC0STre. to the even* of JSfeg^ kxi or binding artxtrafcxi to enforce this 
party shall be errthled to co<* and n ^ ^ However, attorney fees shall not be ^ farcied for participation 
in mecfcstion under Section 15, 
1& NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) 
&gnaci by t ie party glaring ratface; and (c) received fay the other party or the other party's agent no lalar than the applicable 
date referenced in this Contract 
1& ABROGATION, Except for the provisions of Sectkxrte t<U, 10-2, 15 and 17 and exptess warranties made in flics 
Contract, the provisions of thisContn^^^^Jnma|^aR^aassnQ. 
20. ISSK OF LOSS. AW risk of loss to toe Property, inciudsng physical damme Of destruction to the Property or its 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tea' and loss caused by a taking m eminent domain, shall be 
borne by Seller until the transaction i$ closed. 
2 1 - T l i e © Q F T i « E f f i Q * G E . Tfcneisof the essence nBg^rc^ the date set f ^ 
screed to in wftsng by al! parses. Unless otherwise fcxpSdity staled in this Contract: (a) performance under each S&ction 
<K this Contract wtecb references & date steal absolutely be required by £00 PU Mountain Time on the stated date; and (b) 
the term "days' steH mean calendar days and shaft be counted b e ^ k H ^ OT the d ^ tr^c^ng the event which triggers the 
timing raquitemera (LeM Acceptance, Notice of Loan Dentai, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall 
not be binifing upon Me companies, tenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed 
to in writing by such non-party. 
22- FAX TRANSJftSSiON Alffi COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile <fex) transmission of asigned copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23, AGCS'TANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other (a) 
signs the offer or counteroffer ^ her© ootod to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicaies to tm other party or to the other 
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required 
24. COHTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Sa&ar agree that 1km following deadfinm shall appiy to this Contract: 
{a) Loan Application * Fee Deadline September 6, 2004 (Dare) 
(b) Sefier Dlsciosam Ctoadhne 
(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline 
(d) Lo*m Denial Deadline 
(e) Appraisal Dcwdlins 
(f) Setttaroent Deadline 
September 13.2004 
c^ r^^ ra?Q4^ 
September 30. 2004 





. (Date) October 29, 2004 , 
a . OFFS1 AND TttlE FOR ACCB^ANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and concftions. If 
Seller does notaccept this offer by: 5 3 Q _ f ] AM TX| P i l Mountain Time on Seatember'fr 2004 (Date), 
tjss-off«r!shall lapse; and toe Brokerage shall rsiimttte Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer, 
(Buyer's Signature) ra" (Offer Date) ^ (Buyer's ^ fam) (Offer Date) 
Ttm taw ottlMittMvaOttar OMMsftafl bo retenmtf to * * tt« "OMw Rafwroca Date" 
Doug and. Drea MarKham 
(Buyers'Names) (PLEASE PRINT) 
i 
(Notice Address) (Zip Coda) (Phone) 




[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFEtt TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the tem^ arKl conditicm specified 
above. 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyers Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or 
V motfiftcatfons as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO. . 
{S^^r^OOBttute) 
. ^ 3 - o < 
(Date) (Time) (Skier's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Sellers'Names) (PLEASE PRttfT) 
I 1 REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. 
(No^ce Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State law requires Broker to fumfeh Buyer and Seller wth copies of this Contract bearing all signatures, (fill in applicable 
section below,) 
A , l ledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Coptract bearing all signatures: jppM*,^ 
(Buyer's Signature) 
DougMarkham 
(Date) '(Buyers Sioflatufe) 
Drea Marknam 
(Date) 
(Sellers Signature) (Date) (Seller's Signature) (Date) 
B. J pe*3C*iaHy caused a final copy of the* 
deOueredon 
Sent/Deliveied by (specify), 
Contract baring all signatures to be { ] faxed [ ] mailed I J hand 
, postage prepaid, to the [ 1 Seller [ I Buyer 
7 1 « TOfW APPROVED BY Tlffi UT>« REAL EOT^^ 
Page 6 of 6 pages Seller's Initiate 2 S< Buyer's initials^ Data. 
p.J// 
SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THiSSELLEH HKANCING AQOOIDUtl te made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Q 8 ^ Reference Date of August 3 1 . 2 0 0 4 .between Doug and Drea Markham 
as Buyer, md . lay and Qfflrhy Rmrttey as Seller, regarding 
the Ptoperty located at 979 Oarnmftrnn Vaftey Drive . The terms ofthts ADDENDUM are 
hereby tncxxporaied as part of the REPC. 
1. CREDIT DOCUIIOflnS- Seller'sextension!ctf onecfittoBuyershaflbeevidercedby: Ex]Note«*KfDeed ofInsst 
I ] Note and A IHm^ustveD^ of Trust [ IQtften 
2. CEHBJnrTEBlES- IT^etenrooftheaecBlttoc^ 
$285000 pnTO^arflouitfoftte 
$ 9 3 9 f t f & oarmnqffr . llieefrtro unpaid balance of o r i ^ ^ months 
ftomdafeoftheNofee. Fk^ pavrrwit due D e c f y n l w l *04 , Add^onal principal foments, bafioon payments or other 
temis asfoaows: &100 onn Hii** on rteramfter 1
 f 2005 after haltoon payment, monthly payment will be 
redtimrftQtl SH.fiO 
TTiecirei^^ 
Q^P9^ to provide loE3tiyor at Settiemont: (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written disdosure 
of the total interest Buyer w$ pay to maturity of tfte Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on Joan 
closing costs. 
S. TAXES AT® JtSSESSJffSTSL In aricfiaon to ft® payments referenced in Section 2 stove. Buyer shall also be 
raspons&fe Ion (a) property taxes; (b) homeowners association dues; (c) special assessments; and (d) hazard insurance 
premiums OT the Property. These ob%Btions wfil be pakl: £ ] directty to SelJer/ejcrow Agent on a monthly basis [x 
Idlroc^faiheapp&katbte&w^^ 
4. PAYIIENT* B * J ^ S payments under Sections £ and 3 abov^ [X] Salter I ] an Escrow Agent if an 
Esoow Agent ^actasEsciowAgentandwfflbefBspo 
on any underlying mortgage or deed of tost (file ^j^derfyingmoilgage^ Cost of setting up the escrow 
accountshalfbepaMby: f I Buyer! 1 Safer f ] spBt ewtty betwean the partta*. 
5. LATEPAl^l^Jfr /B^PAYlOrf , Any paymsrenotmade within J * ^ ^ 
of $25 or %of.the instalment due, whichever is {peater. Amounts in defauitshafl bear interest at a rate 
ofS.fi % per annum. A8 or part erf ^ p r i a c ^ balance on tb^ 
6w DUEOW-3ALE. As pari erf the Safer OisdQst#^ 
Copy ctf the underlying nu>i^^ Buyer's obligation to purchase 
UITK^ ttiis Cort^ar te <xindMjon^ in accordant with Section 8 
ofihe REPC. U she holder of the underiying ravage cafetfie Joan <*je as a result (^ ttws transacfton, Buyer a^ees to 
discharge the underiying Joan as mqufred by the mortgage lender. In such event, Seller's remaining equity shail be paid as 
provided in the credit documents, 
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a nequtod part of this ADDBNIDUM, the attached Buyer 
Rnanciailnfonnafjon Sheet Buyerm^ use tfos Buyer Finance fa to 
swd the Attorney Generafs Office, or may provide comparable written information in a different format, together with euch 
addifcnal informal^ a Buyer I 1 WILLI x l WILL NOT provide Seller withogges-of1jBiT> 
'-tfjfijiraSKrthetwop^ that Seller may contact Suyer&cunent^^ 
^emftfeytraOTf^ in the 8uyer Financial Information Sheet 
a ^ L L H * A P f ^ V A i C j ^ g S e i ^ in Section 24(b) of the REPC, Buye^shall-prowde^ 
loSstok j t j i i y^^ a consumer credit reporting ageoey_3efemay_i#e the 
credit r e p o i t a ^ f l S f H ' ^ to evaluate thecredit-
worthiness of Buyer, 
Pagelof2pao«9 Seller'sloltia&iJ'^ Pats? f<;\' Buyer's Initiate \ W ^ Date„y ^ ^ 
PROM ~ fincirrea Gasporra* DBS 
09/^3/2804 17:35 M356S24&' 2fl 
;805 SS7H05&3 
•is -aeQepti&fo if ^ c a m e m ^ ^ * ^ f r ra^ 
«S-ttEK}3» © r f i y f t W ^ &os*»«w Period 
ma&ttoBn^ Eaneft Alotwy 
Dapaafc 
-«S JWiurolo Objact 9 F a s a l t e * « ^ ^ ^ a Buyer 
amount <if «to xxSdbtap^ ie9$ «D !$» Setter. « * £ & * paytorsu* p c ^ - t f ^ t a w « -
^ c © i * M i d K ^ ^ not 
4aad3kd%^^ L i §AM{XJPM 
aass&a^ «3apiea *ie oBer as art forth in fte SELLER BNANCJNG 
•frfirl. .
 : 
Social -Security- Number 
f ]&**"[ 1 {Date) flirm) S o c ^ S ^ s j ^ & u i ^ 
/? 
v | R&ECJlOlfc I £8atfer| lAqpw^^ClBa^4ofiBO0^3&i^aMANC{MGAI»ENDUM. 
ISgA&uty *Da*fc) (Time) {8ifnature) (Date) (now) 
Peg* 2 of 2 page* ^Owr^lalfWs Gala 
1*f l( 
a.1 Seller Review. % the B>afejef^ & Inspe^ 
revww ttecredk report and tf»B 
is acceptable. If the cortettofthecrocitreports 
eifhar^ajprovikie^ 
REPC by providing written notice to Buyer by the Evaluations & inspections DeadSne referenced in Section 24(c) of the 
REPC The Brokerage, upon roctipt dt 3 copy of §eSer"s wrigen norjce of ^TgaJfeSgn, ^ M r$|yrn $p 8yy$r th$ Earnest 
Money Deposit 
8*2 Salter Objections. If Seter does not knmedi&efy cancel the RH*C as provided above, Sefler may, by toe 
Eva&iarjons& Inspectors Buyer 
aiKfS€fesriafi haw seven calendar d 
in writing upon ihe manner of resolving Baler's c*|edkxis- Buyer may, but stafl not be required to, resolve Seller's 
cfc^ectjons. tf Seller and Buj^hsi^nofcagreed^OT 
flie RH*Cfay provkfing written nofce ID Buyer no feferthan time calendar days after exptaaSon of the Response Period. 
The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Senary written notice of canceHation, shaH return to Buyer the Earnest Money 
Deposit. 
-&3 Failure to Object ffSeSer does notdeisver a wra^ en objection to Buyer regewfeig tte cracfe repeat or a Buyer 
Ofectosure by the Evaluation* & Inspecfions Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC or cancel tfie REPC as 
prowted in Sections &l or8.2 of f}jss ADDB4DI&}. the credft report and Buyer Disclosures **& be deemed approved by 
Setter. 
9. TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer! JSHALLI ISHALLNOT provide toSmm-almid^spc^^mBhmBmv^'m^e 
amount of the indebtedness to the SeSer; ami sfiaffpc^lbrajcbpofic^atSdateni^jL 
1€L DtSCLQSarffiQFTAXSDHBfl^^ By no later than Sefltenient, Buyer and Setter shall disclose 
toeachoftieriheirresf^^ 
ivitti federal laws on r^x»tlng jmxigage fir^re^ fo fiSngs^fth the Internal Revenue Service. 
Toibespclenttrieterm^^ 
arricouniBr©fiBra,tJie^^ AfiothertenraoftheREr^indtf 
« K x J ^ b y m 1 Buyer shafl have until 5 : 0 0 f 1AM[X]PM 
*tounia*> Time cm September ± 2004 {Date), to accept ihe terms of this SBJLER FINANCING ADDENDUM in 
accordance with Section 23 of trie REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING 
ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
[ ]Buyer[ J Seller Signature (Date) (Time) ~ Social Security Number 
_ V ' - , . ^ . - < ^ > - . 
[ ] Buyer j^J Setfe^^nater^ ^=^-^>- (Date) (Time) Social Security Number 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: [ J Sailor [ J Buyer hereby accepts these terms. 
f/\J COUNTEROFFER: I ISeJterf 1 Buyar presents as a counteroffer the terms set forth on the attached ADDENDUM 
NO. 
T T S & A . — — ^ T ^ 
(Signature) ^ - ^ ^ ~ (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Data) (Time) 
I I REJECTION: [ ISW!*r[ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) fllme) 
TIOT R » W JM^HOVI^ W THEUTAH ffiiU. ESTATC 
Pflge2of2peges Se<lert InitiatejiM Dota^^L^;Buyer's ltifttete_ fi -/"?, ,« am 1 ^ ^<( 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
TO 
REAL ESTATE HJfiCHASE COHTRACT 
/U ^ \( 
Pagel of 1 
TI*SISAHtX]A0peffiUli I ] COtfKTEfiOmSR *o Hiat REAL STATE PUR04 /^ CONTIWH* (the TB^C-) with 
an Offer Reference Date of Ancmst 3 1 , 2004 , indudng alS prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
Doro and ftran Hnrkfa^ aa as 8wer. and J»v and Parley Bradley as Seller, 
reoaftfingthe Property located at973 Paggjeron val ley Drive . The 
f&towing terms are hereby aK»n»rasB8d as part of the REPC: 
1) S e l l e r agrees to complete con s t ru c t ion of home, 
2) Bgyetr ajad S e l l e x t o l ± « t expec ta t ions of complf^tirm upon negcfc t r i p t o S t . George 
i n mid Septeaafoer*
 L_ 
3) Fanixtare t o h& jjuclTtded- { s e l l e r t o at tach l i s t of included Items) 
BUYER AHQ SELLER AGREE THAT THE C»NniACT DEAIMJNES f 
p^ x (C*fa^APPUCttBt£8<^ 
^ ^ o the extents ienns<#tfissA£^ 
sfi aid counteroffers, these fenns shall control. Afi otfier terms of the REPC. including all prior adderKte and counteroffers, 
°HVBhfiQ[ffig^^ IBfeF^rsl^l^^ur« i^iOO_[ JAMIXJPM 
Mourrtalrni^^ 31 J 2004 fDate). to &M&& the ternis of this ADOBMDUM in accordance with Ihe 
ofSec^onaSoftheRS^C. Unless so accepted, Ute offer as set forth In this ADDBIDUM shall lapse. 
_ . , _ - — *?-)—^ 
JXJ BuywViaeMer^nSJre (Dale) (Time) [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature (Date) fTime) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNrefK)^^ 
CHECK ONE: 
I I ACCEPTANCE: I JSolter[ ]Buyor hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
lyi COUffIERQR=ER: [ ] Safer { J&iy^presenteasacaunteroff^tfietennsof attached AODENDUM NO. 
( S i g n a t u ^ ^ ^^>T" (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
[ 1 ffiJECTIOK: I iSea^rJ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Tune) (Sign^a) (Date) (Time) 
7 m FOTH AFFROTSD BY T ^ 
BT&ZTtiTE AUGUST & 2003. rTflBalAOe»AlfflStJPeia0«£MJLPREVlOUe5LY APPROVED VBISIONSOFTfflSPOftll. 
09/03/2694 17:35 143565246/28 
S * p 0 2 O * n** AVp P « - i d c Hcr-n-rs I n c . 
Kstz.ii J ur-v T »-•» J - ID 
< 4 3 5 J 3 7 - f - 2 6 8 3 p . I t 
/ / * ' // 
ADDENDUM NKX 3 
I D 
Rf-AL ESTATE PURCHASE COWTHACT 
r*»\> <*-
wyw^g^PirDpa^te^itf^i^f ia«i^*«3&gr,LPrfTr,T /a. Angara** ETE^ 
11 H o t I W — E W b» i a c r t ^ f j l t o ? ^ . ^ 
2i yitytticycc ro *& JIW,HH I H B Q 3 y ^f t . * *" * 
^JA^A^^T- is" Rig ~*-^?£AS£fo -Wv^f^wpb^ M 
" " ' — * — * — — — „ g , , , 
^ M M M B H K M W K W L J T I *^p^ff^»y^M PRIST sdkxHHdtal 
6TX7 GQUflfBWQ0QS8» "1 
tfeffwdttfeAOB&flBtftEr X 





TOTAL HEALTH CARE PARTNERS, INC, 
* 800-891-5165 
A 3835-R THOUSAND OAKS BLVD., #130 
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ADDENDUM 2 
ADDENDUM 3 
Red Desert Realty, LC 
140 North Tuacahn Dr. #49 
lvins, Utah 84738 
The undenrigned Buyers and SeUerswto 
dated August 31,2004 relative to the property as : 979 Damraeron Valley Dr, 
Hereby declare said agreement to be null and void by leason of:" Buyers failure to 
provide the seller with a F ^ 
deadline stated in Section 8 of the Sellers Financing Addendum that refers to the 
date in die Real Estate Purchase Contract in section 24^b) Contract Deadlines. 
Seller has elected to caned this Contract at this time." 
And mutually release the parties from any ainrfaUobUgations there under whhiK)fiir^ 
due force or effect To said parties. 
Deposits in the amount of $ 10,000,00 are being held by Century 21 At The ftocldcs/ 
StGcorge,in a non-interest bearing trust account (>otury21 AtTheRodaes/StGeoree 
is hereby authorized and directed to promptly disburse said deposits in the following 





- Purchaser Dale 
Purchaser Date 
Purchasers Real Estate Agent 





At The Rockies 
665 E. St George Blvd 
St George, Utah 84770 
Business (435) 673-9090 
Fax (435) 628-1997 
Toll Free (800) 826-0354 
Attention: Jay and Darby Bradley, 
September 24, 2004 
As per your cancel latkm of the Real Estate Contract dated August 31,2004 rd ati ve to the 
property located at 979 Dammeron Valley Dr., the buyers, the Markham't, are going 
forward with the contract The $10,000 earnest monies you required are still held in the 
Century 21 trust account Included is a copy of their credfa report and financial 
statements for your review. Ifyou choose not to accept seller financing, the Markhara's 
have in place financing with Country Wide Mortgage for the purchase price of this 
property. 
As discussed on the 12 of September 2004, when the buyer bad flown in from California 
to go over these referenced items, financial $ (item S seller financing addendum), list of 
expected con^edon (item 2 addendum IX fi^^ 
both buyer and seller agreed to go over these at a later date, as this time was not good for 
you, the sella". 
The Markhara's are going forward with this contract We would like to exercise Real 
Estate Purchase Contract line item 15 on or before September 30,2004. We require a 




Century 21 At The Rockies 
Each Office Is IndeoendenUv Owned And Ooerated 




/ / ^ N \ 
At The Rockies 
665 E. St. Georga Blvd 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Business (435) 673-9090 
Fax (435) 628-1997 
Toll Free (800) 828-0354 
Jay and Darby Bradley, 
September 27, 2004 
Jay, I did receive your phone call today, I was showing property in outlying areas and my 
cell service was sketchy A best. We have only Darby's cell phone number, which goes 
straight to voice mail We sent a package to bar office, which the saver said was 
undeliverable. Today I sent a package certified mail to her office it is the only address 
we have for her. 
By Friday October 1
 f 2004, the Markhamf s, want a date set for mediation so they can 
schedule the time to come out here for the mediation Their intent is to still close on this 
property, if we can not mediate, they will sue for specific performance. Their attoroey 
stated that they will file a l i s Pendens and will sue for fraud and punhive damages. 
I believe that mediation is in everyone's best interest, please call so we can arrange a 




Century 21 At The Rockies 
ERch OfficQ is independently Owned And Operated 
r\ r\ r\<-* ^ 
ADDENDUM 8 
/I ^ K \ d\. &+$C&<2< S 
At The Rockies 
665 E. St. George Blvd 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Business (435) 673-9090 
Fax (435) 628-1997 
Toll Free (600) 828-0354 
9-30-04 
Jay Bradley, 
To memorialize our oQnversatfon from today, 9-30-04 at approximately 9:30 am, you are 
refusing mediation and do not intend to go fbrwaixl with the contraa for the purchase of 
the property at 979 Dammeron Vail ey Dr. We are to contact your attorney Robert 
Jensen with any further communication. 
The buyers are notifying you that any c o n b ^ 
The attorneys will communicate from this point forward. 
Carolyn Norton A J ^S*L~~-
Each Office Is independently Owned And Operated 
ADDENDUM 9 
CeJl(435) 632-4064 \J2ruU\J^ym CeU(435) 467-5454 
At The Rockies 
665 E St. Qeorg&'BlvcL. 




FAX NUMBER: Z ^ Q L * ^ 
TO: JcW t OcrloU fcfaj \<t\j 
COMPANY 
FROM: CfirolyA / vJgCTar \ 
PAGES (INC. COVER): V 
SUBJECT: 
.££_.. Kabert > W g<f
 n / £ 7*/ -70CV„ 
If you have any questions, or did not receive ail of the pages, please call (435) 673-9090 
The materials contained in this facsimile transmission are private and confidential and are the property of the 
sender. The information contained in the material is privileged and is intended only for the use of the 
individual(s) named above. If you have received this facsimile in error, please Immediately notify us by 
telephone to arrange for return of the forwarded documents to us. Thank vou! 
« ™ - w gt'ivn FroKwntr>wifc H«m Loins' ITHlWttl 
H O M E LOANS 
E a s y . Real ly ." 
6400 Legacy Dr., FIX 255 
Piano, TX 75024 
WW MWl/WB H U 











Thank yon far allowing Cbimteywide the opportunity to do your official 
mortgage pr^quali5c«tiorL Hease present this letter to Keatara dining your 
buyxng/krikingproc^ Kymhavequestkinsarneedl^^ 




Interstate Lending Gtoitp 
S68~SO0-S222xlS92 
Ifyuuhitvereotwedthie^trarism^ 
5^ rt?OBiNnngfeKtranemi85k^  
Countrywide Home lotm at 1-S0044W048 extetsfoti 2288 






Cteer Doug Martham: 
Cwflfatulaltorttl TheeiHdos^ccitfBe^alfldftayra^ 
You^nowamonqa^tcSsnovpof ipn^b^ 
th« horn*buy^gprocesseaiyand3rfbTTl*W5. Forf*cr30ytftrs, Cotmiiywfde hatb«ma teadartnd 
ki F F « O § Iwrre o*JnonsWp portofe tar mort people 
c*rtJtart*kib*nd. U^-frt^ pm^u&tfioatioii 1 h ^ 
thf home sate process wifeufr «nti ««iy, * i * t g you both * m and money. 
If you nt&H any assistance or have any quoafatts, ptaote fesl fN*tocalrr«at(flG5}aoo42Q,w.i3$2* 
•nPowcott 
Home Low Conctdtanf, Interstate Landing 
(9^)600-3222 i x t l 3 t e 
(WM&SM-OWFox 
$lfrph3f!jnFEKuttf%wunliywod€XOffi 
*Tntare»«#gtg&^c«t i I i c^ ford^^ Appro^ is »/bjert to g^frcjory f»^wofpr»pi<ty.1|nwftqiar 
<fe)QUU lOU&l* (JMOjJWW f&qacffixnftftiS find VftffflCStiOfl or fHKHWlfllKHI pnjvktad by bairo%C4'_ 
Sar-10-M OS-,31m ErorCatmtryviAi Hw Uuu ITHIWUI H t t P.WJ/WS 
Countrywide' 
H O M E L a A f t s 
Issued to: DomUaricham 
2231KefMcoftCt 
fcfcoMrar^pteasurttof^akxgtow^ 
Purchase Pwen $ 550,000,00 
is* Mortgage Loan Amount X 440,OW.00 
SccOtV^HfW«HiQljc»nAfTHJU^ 4? 3^000100 
Dow* Paytoenr $ 55100000 
RwncoTYpe: PayopfonARM 
Loaa Program: 0 
Intern* Rate MPRT f.7»* 1772 % 
Otitfrt^fU&XttFitt: 0.000% &00PK 
Twine 500 Months 
Ooaupancy/PtopeftyTypo* arK/fana «^R . 
Dofeoftesue-. OT02OO4 
Now you can shop fey your again home wim wore ^  Aanwoyiiaad todon: and kmw*w& in home 
toara, w#-^youcM-prornii^torrate 




*• APR (a a* estimate and may be nwro or less wfth any d)8fig(»M loan a n w ^ down pt^mettwo^ 
tofm* Arty ra^ircfftaa* may kM^ your approved IOM 
r - fV r tE ; i_v^«-%>-w 
Easy. Really." 
6400 Legacy Dr., PTX 255 
Piano, TX 75024 
t^sss^r "Hv> 
TO: Doug Markhain DATE: 9/30/04 
FAX: 805-557-0503 
PHONE: # Pages Including Cover: 3 
FROM: Steve Prescott 
PHONE: 866-8003222, x.1392 
FAX: 888-854-0647 
Congratulations!! 
Thank you for allowing Countrywide the opportunity to do your official 
mortgage prequalification. Please present this letter to Kealtors during your 
buying/looking process. If you have questions or need help please call me. 




Interstate Lending Group 
866-800-3222x1392 
If you have received this fax transmission in error, or if you would otherwise prefer to 
stop receiving fax transmissions related to your home loan application, please call 
Countrywide Home Loans at 1-800-449-4049 extension 2288 








Westlake Village, CA 91361 
Dear Doug Markham: 
Congratulations! The enclosed certificate officially names you as a Pre-Qualified CountrywWe Home Buyer*. 
You ere now among a select group of smart buyers who have chosen Countrywide Homo Loans to make 
the home buying process easy and affordable. For over 30 years, Countrywide has been a leader and an innovator 
m making home ownership possiWe for more peop*e. 
You are afl set to negotiate with the home seller from a position of strength and control with the enclosed 
certificate In hand. Up-front pre-quaffficatfon from a major lender puts you in the best possible position to complete 
the home sale process quickly and easily, saving you both time and money. 
If you need any assistance or have any questions, please teal free to call me at (866) 800-3222. exL 1302, 
Sirto^ry, 
f>hen Poescott 
Home Loan Consultant, Interstate Lending 
(866) 800-3222 ext 1382 
(888) 854-0647 Fox 
stephenjrescott@countrywide.com 
•Please see enclosed certificate for detafls. Approval is subject to satisfactory review of property, financial 
documents, program requirements and verification of imormirtion provided by borrower. 
| L P J [ £ f v * Ms«Mlrtf U*Uf 0 1 M f OHintywtfe H o * * l u m . Inc. Tnw*r **vte» *m«* turn fl,* property of (&n*y*mCc^*^Vfa,t^*nat9rmw*iUi*m*9$ 
Sam* poxfcjcts mt% n« t W k M , to •« «*%**, Uc*nt«<16y ttw DtfartmtfK «f Guponnhm w « V th« C#ffMiWi B*#W#«W Uartq*Q* LtmfcigAa. 
MARK-00031 
Counttywide 
H O M E L O A N S 
Certificate Number 2086361296 
Issued to: Doug Markham 
2231 Keftmscott Ct 
Westlake Village, CA 91361 
It la our great pleasure to pass along the news that you are approved* for a Countrywide Home Loan. 
Purchase Power 
1st Mortgage Loan Amount 




Interest Rate /APR": 
Origination / Discount Points: 
Term: 
Occupancy / Property Type: 










2nd harm SFR 
modern 
* Please note that satisfactory review of property, financial documents, and program requirements 
are needed to issue fmailoan approva/. 
Congratulations!! 
Now you can shop for your dream home with more confidence. A$ recognized leaders and Innovators in home 
loans, nyrfpve you our promise to make doing business with us as easy and affordable as possible. 
^tephenJ 
Home fcwh Consultant, Interstate Lending 
(866)800-3222 x 1392 
(888)854-0647 Fax 
Stephenj)rescott@countrywide.com 
* Secondary Financing loan details are not represented. 
** APR Is an estimate and may be more or less with any changes in loan amount down payment or other 
terms. Any rate Increase may lower your approved loan amount 
ADDENDUM 10 
10/84/2004 19:11 1435652-
T 1 • T ^ ^ « ^ ^ r % 1240 East 100South.Suite 9 I enJons J ensen st. &*&, m 84?$>o 
J
 y Tcl(435) 674-9718 & Bayles, LLP 
Attaracn & Counselor* *t Law 
Fax f435) 674-9006 
o ney* 
Bruce C. J 
Robert M. 
Thomas J. Bayles, F.C 
tycritons@iJbliw.net 
r ce . Jenkins, P.C rjcnaengftjblaw net 
t . Jensen, P.C tbaylK@iJbUw net 
October 4, 2004 
HAND DELIVERY 
VIA FACSIMILE. 435-628-1997 
and US MAIL 
CENTURY 21 AT THE ROCKIES 
Attn: Carolyn Norton 
665 E. St George Blvd. 
St George, UT 84770 
Re: NOTICE OF CANCELLATION 
REPC dated 9-1-04 
Buyer - Doug and Drea Markham 
Seller - Jay and Darby Bradley 
Dear Ms. Norton: 
This letter is written to reconfirm the Cancellation Notice delivered by Sellers to yon on 
September 20, 2004. That initial Notice of Cancellation is based upon the partes' "Seller and 
Financing Addendum," paragraph 8, which requires: "By the Seller DisclosureDeadlme, referenced 
in Section 24(b) of the REPC, Buyer shall provide to Seller at Buyer's expense, a current credit 
report on Buyer from a Consumer Credit Reporting Agency,* This requirement corresponds with 
the obligations and responsibilities imposed by the "Evaluation and Inspection** deadlines set forth 
in paragraph 8 of the REPC. Based upon that September 20, 2004 Notice of Cancellation from 
Seller, without more, this REPC is properly cancelled. 
Additional Notice of Cancellation is hereby given to the Buyer, pursuant to the "Seller 
Financing Addendum,*" paragraph 8.1(b) which provides "by the Evaluation and Inspection's 
deadline referenced m Section 24(c) of the REPC, Seller shall review the credit report and the Buyer 
Disclosures to determine if the content of the Credit Report and the Buyer Disclosures is acceptable. 
If the content of the Credit Report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller, Seller may 
elect to...(b) immediately cancel tbcREPC by providing written notice to Buyer by the evaluations 
EXHIB.T#^ D A T E X - ^ j-
N CAROLE A. YELTOM CZ A HI DI I ±_ 
n(LTOh! DEPOSITION 
18/04/2004 19:11 ^ ^ - - -
CENTURY 21 AT THE ROCKIES 
Attn: Carolyn Norton 
October 4,2004 
Page 2 
and inspection deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC." Notice is hereby given, that 
Sellers do hereby immediately cancel the REPC based cm the content of the Credit Report and the 
Buyer Disclosures. Specifically, these documents are poor jfax copies, are sloppy and in many 
instances are illegible, the attached schedules arc not completed with detailed information requested 
.in. the forms; Sellers are concerned with the admission of bankruptcy or judgment; Sellers are 
concerned with the sheer length, of the Consumer Credit Report, as well as the fact that the package 
was out of order, appears to be presented with missing pages and potential amounts of the report 
being cut off or improperly copied 
The financial information was received on September 27,2004, and the remaining portions 
ofBuyers Disclosures weir not received until September 30r 2004, being a substantial period oftime 
after such documents were due and in a contract wherein time was of the essence. 
Accordingly, this REPC was first cancelled for untimely disclosure, and separately cancelled 
for rejection of the content of the disclosures, subsequently and untimely received. 
Sincerely. 
JENKINS, JENSEN & BAYLES, LLP 
RMJ/rc 
cc: Jay and Darby Bradley 
JB.l JtrCattltry21 ,?-30-^C^7»d 
